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I. Introduction 
Since the end of World War II, more than twenty of international human rights treaties 
have been signed by most countries. As Louis Henkin wrote, the present age may be seen 
as ‘the Age of Rights’.1 It is expected that international human rights treaties affect 
member states to respect human rights and make differences in the protection of human 
rights. This expectation is based on an assumption implied by many human rights scholars 
and advocates that international human rights standards can lead states to protect such 
values in the domestic arena.
2
 Indeed, human rights scholars suggest that ‘once states 
adopt the rhetoric of human rights and begin to move toward norm compliance, there is no 
turning back’.3 Ultimately, the human rights movement expects that human rights norms 
established in international law will build a better world.
4
 
 However, at the present time, it can be easily heard from the global news media that 
widespread breaches of international human rights remain, even though most states have 
joined the various international human rights treaty regimes. For example, in 2011, ‘The 
Economist’ published two articles5 about China’s political and economic changes after its 
membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The first article’s title is ‘China’s 
economy and the WTO: All Change’, and the second is ‘Chinese politics and the WTO: No 
Change’. As the articles’ names imply, the Chinese economy has significantly changed and 
China has achieved impressive outcomes in terms of economic development. Through the 
joining WTO system and compliance with WTO law, China has opened its economic 
system and also tried to modify its national economic regulations in order to adjust to 
international standards that WTO required. Cooperating with other states within WTO 
system and Complying with WTO law, China could achieve the economic development 
and could successfully participate in international economic order. However, the second 
article argued that despite these substantial economic changes, Chinese politics had not 
                                         
1 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, 1990) 
2 Andrew T. Guzman and Katerina Linos, ‘Human Rights Backsliding’, 102 California Law Review (2014) 
603-654, at 605. 
3 Eran Shor, ‘Conflict, Terrorism, and the Socialization of Human Rights Norms: The Spiral Model 
Revisited’, 55 Social Problems (2008) 117-138, at 118. 
4 David Rieff, ‘The Precarious Triumph of Human Rights’, New York Times Magazine, 8 Aug 
1999,<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/08/magazine/the-precarious-triumph-of-human-
rights.html?pagewanted=3> (visited 11 Dec 2014) 
5 ‘China’s economy and the WTO: All change’, The Economists, Dec 10th 2011; Chinese politics and the 
WTO: No change, The Economists, Dec 10th 2011. 
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changed to the same extent. In other words, although China’s power and impact on the 
world has significantly increased, China is still one of the major human rights-violation 
countries. China’s power and economic impact resulted in joining WTO system and 
economic growth and development. Although China could obtain the results by trying to 
comply with WTO law and international standards, this compliance with international law 
do not lead to protect international human rights values and standards that international 
human rights law requires. Moreover, according to the Report on Torture by United States 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), even the United States (US) – which is 
widely considered to be one of the most democratic countries – used the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s Detention and Interrogation Program for various forms of 
torture on detainees between 2001 and 2009.
6
 In addition, human rights violations are not 
only seen in the cases of China and US but more widely in many other countries in the 
world. Many countries, including liberal democratic countries in the West, offered 
assistance to the US effort. From recent human rights records
7
, in 2011, 93 countries used 
torture ‘frequently’, 65 countries ‘occasionally’, and just 34 countries ‘not at all’.8 
Henkin, in his book How Nations Behave, argued that ‘almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of 
the time’.9 If Henkin’s finding is right and is the case, however, international human rights 
obligations seem to be different from other international legal obligations because of the 
vast human rights violations in various countries. Now is the time to evaluate international 
human rights law. It is important to evaluate the effectiveness and limits of international 
human rights treaties in order to understand this gap between the expectations associated 
with international human rights law and the realities of how these norms function. The 
reality of human rights violations has lead to questions about the problems of international 
human rights law and why states violate international human rights obligations but 
generally not other international law such as ‘WTO law’10 and ‘law of war’11. To 
                                         
6 For more detail, See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, 
<http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/sscistudy1.pdf> (visited 30 Dec 2014); The Guardian, ‘CIA 
torture report’, <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/cia-torture-report> (visited 28 Dec 2014) 
7 David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay, CIRI Human Rights Documentation, 
<http://www.humanrightsdata.com/> (visited 5 Jan 2015) 
8 Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), at 3. 
9 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd edn, Columbia University Press, 1979), at 47. 
10 See Alan O Sykes, ‘When is International Law Useful?’ (2013). New York University Law and Economics 
Working Papers, Paper 348, <http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/348> (visited 20 April 2015), at 14-17.  
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understand this phenomenon, one should study states’ behaviour, especially compliance, 
concerning international law, including customary international law and international 
treaties because compliance is one of the most central questions in international law.
12
 
Without an understanding of the connection between international law and state actions, 
one cannot hope to provide useful policy advice with respect to international law. 
From the research background, this paper asks the main question that ‘what the 
problem of international human rights law is’. Why international human rights law does 
not fully induce states to comply with their human rights obligations?’ What is the reason 
why states do not seem to comply with international human rights law even though they 
relatively comply with other international laws? Are there any differences between other 
international laws and international human rights law? To answer this main question, it is 
needed to know the reason ‘why states comply with international law’. To analyse 
international human rights law and states’ behaviours and to compare compliance with 
international human rights law to other international laws, the answer of the question ‘why 
states comply with international law’ is very important. Moreover, not only to discover or 
show the problem of international human rights but also to suggest theoretically coherent 
and logical explanation, this paper will represent a law and economics approach as an 
answer the question ‘what the better way to understand international law and international 
legal issues is’. To understand international law and states’ behaviours, a law and 
economics approach can be better way or method rather than other methods of or 
approaches to international law. However, a law and economics does not commonly 
accepted by international legal scholars and is generally misunderstood by them. Therefore, 
this paper will suggest the usefulness of law and economics approach to international law. 
Overall, this paper will explore the answers to three questions in order to solve the main 
question: ‘what is the better way to understand and study international law and 
international legal issues?’, ‘why do states comply with international law?, and ‘what is the 
problem of international human rights law?’ 
To achieve the goal to answer the central research questions and to discover the 
                                                                                                                           
11 See Eric Posner, ‘Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity’ (2010), John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 537, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1693974> (visited 
5 December 2014) 
12 See Harold H. Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’, 106 The Yale Law Journal(1997) 2599-
2659, at 2599-2601. 
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connection between international law and state behaviour, this paper will investigate the 
problem of international human rights law, using a law and economics approach to 
international law. After the brief introduction, part II will introduce the law and economics 
approach to international law. In this part, the possibilities and benefits of applying an 
economic analysis to international law will be presented. In part III, this paper will answer 
the question of why states comply with international law. Compliance theories from 
international legal scholars and international relations scholars will be reviewed and 
criticised because these theories cannot suggest coherent and logical answer for the 
question and have limits to explain states’ compliance. After this review, the paper explains 
the connection between international law and states’ behaviour using a law and economics 
approach. Part IV will identify the problem of international human rights law, providing an 
answer for the question of why international human rights law cannot fully induce states to 
comply, and clarifying differences between international human rights law and other 
international laws. In this part, the paper will examine universal human rights treaties such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT). The paper will not, 
however, cover regional human rights treaties such as The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) which 
have relatively more effective enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, the analysis will be 
supported by empirical results that have been released from important previous researches. 
Finally, part V will conclude the thesis. 
 
II. Law and Economics Approach to International Law 
   Law and economics has been developed in various areas of legal studies; beyond anti-
trust law and economic law, law and economics has recently applied to contract law, tort 
law, criminal law, and constitutional law. On the other hand, law and economics has much 
less impact on research or study international law. Even though there are an increasing 
number of studies that use law and economics to research international law, its influence in 
international legal study is still limited because international legal scholars lack or 
misunderstand economic theories. However, likewise other areas of law, law and 
economics can expand understanding international law and international legal issues. 
Moreover, based on the broader understanding, law and economics can suggest better 
12 
 
solutions or international legal policies to international society. In this part, under the 
question ‘what the better way to understand international law and international legal issues 
is’, this paper will argue that law and economics is feasible and persuasive methodology of 
international law. First, this part will explain what law and economics is. Second, it will be 
explained that how economic theories are applied to international law with some instances. 
Moreover, in the second sub-part, this paper will discuss ‘why international lawyers have 
avoided law and economics’. 
1. What Is Law and Economics? 
The law and economics movement has been considered to be an influential legal 
methodology whose influence is arguably continuing to expand. In the introduction to the 
third edition of his book, Richard Posner wrote that ‘perhaps the most important 
development in legal thought in the last quarter century has been the application of 
economics to an ever increasing range of legal fields’.13 Moreover, Bruce Ackerman has 
also represented law and economics to be ‘the most important development in legal 
scholarship of the twentieth century’.14 This important interdisciplinary approach was 
already predicted by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said that ‘for the rational study of the 
law the blackletter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man 
of statistics and the master of economics’.15 
Law and economics, known as ‘economic analysis of law’, is a methodology that uses 
(micro) economic theory and method in order to analyse making, enforcement, and effect 
of law. Economics is based on the rational choice theory. The rational choice theory is a 
tool for understanding and modelling social and economic behaviour. In the theory, rational 
choice means that under conditions of scarcity, individual actors rationally behave to 
maximise their preferences. Law and economics uses this economic tool to understand the 
ability of law to affect rational behaviour to maximise their interests inside and outside of 
the market. In other words, economics offers a scientific theory to analyse legal institutions’ 
impact on human behaviour. Law and Economics shares two core pursuits in economics as 
a social science. One is a modelling that is based on theory and is source of prediction and 
hypotheses. The other is an empirical testing that validates and supports the modelling. As 
                                         
13 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3th edn, Little Brown and Company, 1986), at xix. 
14 Quoted in Robert D. Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (4th edn, Addison Wesley, 2004), at 3. 
15 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review (1897) 457-478, at 469. 
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Posner said in the foreword in Essays in Law and Economics,  
To me the most interesting aspect of the law and economics movement has 
been its aspiration to place the study of law on a scientific basis, with coherent 
theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of the 
hypotheses. Law is a social institution of enormous antiquity and importance, 
and I can see no reason why it should not be amenable to scientific study. 
Economics is the most advanced of the social sciences, and the legal system 
contains many parallels to and overlaps with the systems that economists have 
studied successfully.
16
 
Law and economics make possible legal study as science. In addition, economics 
allows useful normative standard to assess role and effect of law and policy. Through 
economics, one can foresee whether law and policy can achieve its goal efficiently.
17
 
In law and economics, thus, economic concepts including price theory, transaction 
cost, game theory, and public choice theory are used ‘to explain the effects of laws, 
to assess which legal rules are economically efficient, and to predict which legal 
rules will be promulgated’.18 
1.1 Price Theory 
Price theory is a starting point and basic tool in economic models, especially 
neoclassical economics.
19
 Price theory is based on the assumption that rational actors 
behave to maximize their preferences.
20
 In other words, if all things are equal, people 
favour cheaper goods and services, ‘as well as more efficient means of achieving their 
nonconsumption goal’.21 Price theory is the basis for a cost-benefit analysis: in order to 
                                         
16 Quoted in Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 14, at 2. 
17 See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 14, at 4-5. 
18 David Friedman, ‘law and economics’, in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume (eds), The New 
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (8 vols, Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), Vol 2, at 144. 
19 Joel P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (Harvard University Press, 2008), at 4; 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in 
Internal Conflict’, 93 American Journal of International Law (1999), 394-409 at 396. 
20 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics’, supra note 19, at 396. 
21 Trachtman, The Economic Structure, supra note 19, at 4 
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achieve one’s preferences, people seek to maximize benefits and minimize costs. 22 
Economists have developed methods using price theory even in a non-monetisable market 
that cannot be converted into money
23
: measuring benefits and costs is not necessarily 
monetised and monetisable.
24
  
Price theory also investigates whether supply and demand will be in stable equilibrium. 
There are two criterion generated from the equilibrium. The first is Pareto efficiency and 
the second is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Pareto efficiency analysis examines whether 
equilibrium that makes one person better off exists without making anyone worse off. 
Kaldor-Hicks analysis, known as potential Pareto efficiency, is a question of whether one 
person’s ‘better off’ is much more than anyone’s ‘worse off’.25 The second analysis, 
Kaldor-Hicks analysis, is importantly equated to cost-benefit analysis.
26
 By using the two 
criteria, legal institutions can be evaluated. Under the Pareto criterion, if a law makes one 
better off without making anyone else worse off, the law can be desirable. Under the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, even though a law make loser worse off, if the law make winners 
better off much more than the losers lose, the law is desirable.
27
 
1.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics is based on the Coase theorem
28
 that if people could 
negotiate or contract with one another without cost, they would always achieve a Pareto 
efficient goal without government or other outside intervention.
29
 According to the Coase 
theorem, if transaction costs could be zero, negotiation and contract between individuals 
can generate efficient results, regardless of whether a law grants property rights to 
whomever.
30
 Conversely, if transaction costs exist, property rights that increase asset 
specificity and certainty can play significant role to reduce transaction costs and to 
facilitate to establish contracts. Based on rational choice, if transaction costs are higher 
                                         
22 Ibid., at 5 
23 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics’, supra note 19, at 396. 
24 Trachtman, The Economic Structure, supra note 19, at 5 
25 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics’, supra note 19, at 396. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Economic foundations of International Law (The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2013), at 13. 
28 For more detail, see Ronald. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 3 Journal of Law and 
Economics(1960) 1-44; ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 4 Economica(1937) 386-405. 
29 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics’, supra note 19, at 396. 
30 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 14, at 89. 
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than the expected benefits from the transaction, the transaction or negotiation will be 
difficult to establish.
31
 Therefore, in the case that there are high transaction costs, to 
achieve a Pareto efficient goal which makes efficient allocation of resources depends on 
how property rights are determined by law. In fact, as transaction costs always exist, the 
insight from the Coase theorem does not mean that government should never intervene.
32
 
On the contrary, legal systems can reduce transaction costs and support negotiation for the 
transaction.
33
 Transaction cost economics refines price theory ‘by including consideration 
of, for example, the cost of identifying potential transactors, negotiating agreement, and 
enforcing agreement’.34 Thus, under transaction cost economics, one can understand why 
actors cannot make agreements even though they can benefit from the establishment of a 
clear rule,
35
 and how to establish legal systems in order to improve efficiency in 
transactions.
36
 
1.3 Game Theory 
Game theory is an economic modelling for analysis of strategic interactions between 
players. The strategic interactions are situations in which one player’s decision based on 
rational choice partly or entirely depends on decisions by others.
37
 The law frequently 
confronts these situations. These situations are similar to games in which players must act 
according to a strategy. A strategy is an intention for acting that reacts to the acting of 
others. In other words, game theory deals with a strategic behaviour. To analyse strategic 
situations, game theory uses the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. In this situation, although players 
can maximize their individual benefit by cooperating with each other, the players fail to 
cooperate.
38
 Game theory can explain some cases in which even though players can expect 
legal rules or institutions that make the all players obtain maximising benefits as a shared 
goal between them, the players might consequently fail to achieve the goal because their 
strategic actions depend on other player’s decisions or actions.39 Thus, game theory will 
                                         
31 김성원, ‘법경제학 국제법 방법론에 관한 연구’, 33 Hanyang Law Review (2011) 65-84 at 71 
32 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics’, supra note 19, at 396. 
33 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 14, at 97. 
34 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics’, supra note 19, at 396. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 14, at 96. 
37 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The Law and Economics’, supra note 19, at 396. 
38 For more detail, see C. Goetz, Law and Economics: Cases and Materials (West Publishing Company, 
1984), at 5-11. 
39 김성원, ‘법경제학 국제법 방법론에 관한 연구’, supra note 31, at 72. 
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improve the understanding of some legal rules and institutions.
40
 
1.4 Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory uses economic tools for dealing with decision making outside of 
markets.
41
 Public choice theory is commonly based on an assumption that politicians, 
bureaucrats, and other government actors are rationally self-interested. The politicians and 
bureaucrats are attracted to maximize their own interests rather than those of the greater 
populace, in the same way as actors generally behave in the private area.
 
The self-interests 
of the decision makers are assumed to be their personal power, wealth and political support.
 
42
 This assumption can give useful insight to test hypotheses regarding the government 
actor’s behaviour on behalf of their government. 43  Through the assumption about 
behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats, public choice theory can indicate that ‘law is 
traded for political support, money, power, and other things that politicians and bureaucrats 
demand’. 44  Thus, public choice theory considers the legislation process as a 
microeconomic system and treats law as goods provided to the ‘highest bidders’.45 
2. Why Law and Economics Approach to International Law? 
  Law and economics can be applied to various area of international law. Law and 
economics methodology can suggest solutions and policies to interpretation of 
international law, compliance with international law, process of making international 
treaties through international organisations, and efficiency of international organisations. 
Despite of the benefits of law and economics approach to international law, many 
international lawyers have still not considered law and economics as possible methodology 
of international law. There may be many explains for the reasons. But, based on research 
by Jeffry Dunoff and Joel Trachtman, this paper will present three important reasons: 
concern of methodology, concern of political bias, and concern of positivism. However, 
these concerns are generated from insufficient understanding or misunderstanding of law 
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and economics.  
2.1 Why Have International Lawyers Avoided Law and Economics? 
2.1.1 Concern of Methodology 
Dunoff and Trachtman as international legal scholars mentioned that ‘[m]any of us are 
uncomfortable with economics’. They represent two reasons. One is that international legal 
scholars distrust economic theory and methodologies which are non-normative, positive, 
and empirical analysis of social phenomenon, and they therefore think that economic 
analysis is difficult to be a part of legal methodologies to study or research for laws as 
normative.
46
 Another is that there are some difficulties to use economic tools or 
methodologies. ‘Complex graphs, charts and multivariable equations may deter those 
trained in the law from employing economic analysis.’47 
However, the tools are not necessarily required for economic analysis of law. The 
complex mathematical analysis that economists use is a small part of the whole economic 
analysis and can give little insights on the international legal issues. In other words, many 
relevant issues for international legal scholars do not require high mathematical skills.
 48 
Moreover, modern law and economics approach is applied by new institutional economics. 
The new institutional economics tries to incorporate ‘neoclassical economics’ with 
institutional analysis, using transaction costs, game theory, public choice and positive 
political economy beyond price theory in neoclassical economics. Because institutions 
between different systems or countries are important, a main tool of this approach is 
comparison. This comparative institutional analysis is already broadly accepted by 
international lawyers even though they criticize the law and economics approach.
49
 
2.1.2 Concern of Political Bias 
In addition to being difficult to access, many critics of economic analysis relate to the 
matter of political neutrality. They argue that the analysis inherently has political biases. 
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Critics consider that economists commit to ‘laissez-faire’ economics policy, cooperate 
either with the liberal or conservative political side, and reject government interventions. In 
the same way, critics of economic analysis reject the attitude to prioritize the values of the 
market in which economic values are maximised rather than other important values. In 
other words, an economic analysis does not appreciate or measure incommensurable social 
values and ‘subordinates those values to economic values’.50 
However, these critics do not also undermine trying to apply an economic approach to 
international law. Dunoff and Trachtman argue that the criticisms are based on a 
misunderstanding of how economics relates to the market. The critics think economic 
analysis blindly objects to government intervention and unconditionally ‘believes in’ the 
market.
51
 But in fact the economic methodologies do not have a bias against government 
regulation or in preference of the market. On the contrary, the methodologies adopt a 
neutral attitude to government intervention and autonomy of the market under rational 
choice and efficiency.
52
 Moreover, the approach admits the possible validity of 
government processes and takes in account the main questions of institutions including the 
market.
53
 Regarding the critic of economics as ignorant of non-monetised values, this is 
also misunderstanding, as law and economics does not ignore non-monetary values. In the 
process of governing, politics is the leading mechanism to choose values. There are many 
non-monetised values that are still worthy of expression. A law and economics approach 
does not object to the choice of values through the political process, nor to a priority of the 
political over the economic.
54
 
2.1.3 Concern of Positivism 
The last criticism is about the positivism of economic analysis. Although the border 
between positive and normative economics is unclear, an essential principle of law and 
economics is its positivism. The positivism emphasizes on empiricism and analysing the 
world as it is, compared with normative perspective as it should be. Dunoff and Trachtman 
say that ‘international lawyers have long done battle with a brand of international legal 
theory that is called “positivist”’. According to them, because international lawyers have 
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struggled and disputed with ‘positivist’ international legal theory, the critics of 
international legal positivism naturally do not see value in applying law and economics 
approach to international issues.
55
 Furthermore, the critics argue that law and economics 
methodologies based on positive economics have advantages to analyse a law as it is, but 
have limitations to suggest an alternative to problematic laws and institutions. In other 
words, law and economics is a useful tool to analyse efficacy of ‘lex lata’, but is difficult to 
present ‘lex ferenda’.56 
As other criticisms of law and economics, however, critics of ‘positivism’ economic 
analysis arise from misunderstanding. Dunoff and Trachtman assert that the critics of 
positivism confuse the positivism of economic analysis with other forms of positivism. 
Historically, international legal scholars confronted the Westphalian positivist view, and the 
Westphalian positivist view was often associated with a realist perspective on international 
relations. That is why many international legal scholars reject the Westphalian positivist 
model. However, positivism in law and economics has a different meaning from 
Westphalian positivism linked with realism. Positivism of law and economics is based on 
methodological individualism, compared with a state-centric approach in Westphalian 
positivism. This methodological individualism emphasises individual choice as ‘individual 
sovereignty’ compared with state sovereignty in the Westphalian positivism. 
Methodological individualism can more easily stress issues for cooperation and/or conflict. 
Therefore, the positivism of law and economics tends to underline the treaties and 
institutions that international legal scholars are interested in.
57
 Moreover, this positivism 
can analyse power and efficiency of international agreements and of international 
organisations, and this positive analysis can also present the problems of international 
agreements and international organisations. Based upon a positive analysis, one can find or 
seek a solution to improve international agreements and international organisations. 
Eventually, a law and economics approach can be a starting point to discuss for ‘lex 
ferenda’, contrary to the arguments of critics.58 
2.2 Applying Law and Economics to International Law 
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Beyond the concerns, law and economics can be applied and be useful tool for 
analysing international legal issues, using price theory, efficient breach hypothesis, 
transaction cost, game theory, and public choice theory. In this part, in order to show or 
make application of each economic theory more clear, explanations are separated. However, 
economic theories are not applied alone but together and supplement each other in order to 
analyse international law. For example, price theory suggests the basis for cost-benefit 
analysis and theory of efficient breach. Transaction economics that supplement price 
theory give insights for the real world as incomplete market. Under the insights from the 
theories, game theory can give explanations states’ strategic behaviours in a international 
circumstance as a game. 
2.2.1 Price Theory 
A law and economics approach gives some insights for interpreting treaties by applying 
market price in a complete competitive market. The approach considers treaties made 
between states or resolutions in international organisations as market price. In other words, 
considering international conferences for making treaties or councils of international 
organisations for resolutions as markets in which information for supply and demand is 
exchanged, the approach recognises that treaties or resolutions in the meeting or 
conferences are market prices concluded between states and, therefore, those preferences 
of parties achieves ‘Pareto Efficiency’. This market-based approach, of course, has a 
market failure problem, and a law and economics approach does not exclude the possibility 
of market failure in which the Pareto Efficiency is not achieved.
59
 Despite the possibility 
of market failure, however, if the treaties or resolutions are considered as maximising 
preferences between parties, a law and economics approach theoretically underlies the 
priority of a text-based interpretation to the treaties or resolutions.
60
 Therefore, law and 
economics emphasises the text-based interpretation even though the approach is 
purportedly an efficiency-based interpretation.  
Text-based interpretation upholds the contracts by the parties to the treaty, and such 
contracts are presumptively efficient when the markets for contracts of treaties or 
resolutions are well functioning. Text-based interpretation supported by such a market 
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approach for determination of preferences is possible to be more respected than a court’s 
analogical interpretation. Furthermore, the priority of text-based interpretation stimulates 
additional transactions because ‘if authoritative interpreters respect the original texts, states 
will be encouraged to enter into treaties’. 61  Ultimately, from a law and economics 
approach, the analogical interpretation based on ‘judicial activism’ by courts is undesirable 
where there is no direct rule for application to an issue. 
In advisory opinion on legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognised and considered an importance of priority or 
necessity of text-based interpretation supported by a market price perspective from law and 
economics.
62
 In the advisory opinion, the ICJ concluded that ‘there is in neither customary 
nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons’63, and ‘there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any 
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such’.64 
This conclusion has been criticised by many international lawyers and, especially, the non 
liquet of ICJ was thought to be a central problem.
65
 However, according to the law and 
economics approach, a solution based on ‘judicial activism’ for overcoming non liquet is 
undesirable.
66
 Moreover, in that case, an argument that nuclear weapons should be treated 
as poisoned weapons has been advanced. In the argument, nuclear weapons would be 
prohibited under ‘the Second Hague Declaration of 29 July 1899’, ‘Article 23 (a) of the 
Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land annexed to the Hague 
Convention IV of 18 October 1907’ and ‘the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925’.67 In 
response to that argument, the ICJ observed that the regulations do not define ‘poison or 
poisoned weapons’ and that different interpretations exist on the issue. In addition, the ICJ 
argued that the term was understood by state practice, and the practice is clear that ‘nuclear 
weapon’ was not treated as a ‘poisoned weapon’ by the parties. Accordingly, the ICJ 
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rejected the argument.
68
 Therefore, the conclusion of the ICJ in this opinion is one 
example which underlies the necessity or priority of a text-based interpretation that the law 
and economics approach emphasise. 
2.2.2 Efficient Breach Hypothesis 
Law and economics can predict the degree of compliance with international law, using 
price theory and cost-benefit analysis. From this perspective, compliance depends on the 
price of breach. If the price of a breach is relatively high, compliance will be expected. To 
be calculated, the price of breach needs both the measure of damages and institutions to 
oblige the payment of damages. With this simple tool, law and economics approaches can 
assess the relative binding force of international treaties and, when the need for enhanced 
compliance exists, can suggest modifications of treaty structures in order to enhance their 
binding force.
69
 From this approach, where an international agreement has no sanctions or 
unfixed sanctions, an expectation for a high level of compliance with the international 
agreement is irrational. Thus, comparing benefit from compliance with cost from breaching 
of international agreements, a law and economics approach gives insight to evaluate or 
estimate a degree of compliance with international agreements and to find solutions for 
improving international regulation.
70
 
In such a way, law and economics uses the theory of efficient breach in domestic 
contract context for analysing compliance or binding force of international agreements.
71
 
The theory of efficient breach is that ‘where breach of contract is more efficient than 
performance, the law ought to facilitate breach in such circumstances’. 72  Although 
contracting parties, courts, and the drafters of contract law strive, there will be 
circumstances that compliance will cost more than benefit but will not be justified by any 
provisions and principle rule of contract law. In these circumstances, if the one party 
prefers to compensate another party for the lost value of compliance rather than comply 
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with the contract, breach is efficient.
73
 In other words, where cost of compliance with a 
contract is higher than benefit of compliance that parties can expect, the efficient breach is 
realised. The theory of efficient breach is the most influential theory from law and 
economics
74
, and the theory is accepted in contract laws in most countries.
75
 
From a normative perspective, however, some international legal scholars give a 
sceptical response to the concept of efficient breach.
76
 They argue that if the idea/theory of 
efficient breach is accepted, the treaty regime will be weakened, and one cannot therefore 
expect states to comply with international treaties sincerely. Traditionally, the belief that a 
treaty will be obeyed, the principle called pacta sunt servanda, has been thought as the 
most important doctrine in international legal thought. If efficient breach is encouraged by 
state’s immediate or short-term interest, the fundamental rule of pacta sunt servanda will 
be undermined, and as a result, it will be more difficult to makes sustained cooperation 
between states through treaty regime.
77
 
The same objection is not only raised in the international context but also in the 
domestic context. Because the belief that contracts will be obeyed is a fundamental rule, 
contracts are important. However, if under certain circumstance the possibility of breach is 
predicted and liability is clear, the problem of theory of efficient breach will be overcome, 
and the efficient breach can be useful under such circumstances. Under circumstance 
where there are effective dispute settlements and obvious remedies to damages that can be 
easily monetised are guaranteed, the theory of efficient breach gives an insight to facilitate 
state’s entry into contract.78 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO 
escape clause is a suitable example which shows the application of efficient breach to 
international law.
79
 Under the WTO Dispute settlement Understanding, in cases where a 
WTO dispute panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with the 
GATT, ‘it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity 
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with that agreement’.80 According to the conclusion by the dispute settlement body, the 
member state can and should match the measure with the agreement by amending or 
retracting the inconsistent measure. However, in case where the state compensates 
damages from the non-complying measure, the measure may be maintained.
81
 
Consequently, the state may escape from amending or retracting the offending measure by 
providing compensation or accepting retaliation authorised by the WTO in order to restore 
‘the balance of negotiated concessions’. 82  Undoubtedly, it is true that escape from 
obligation of international treaties should not be utilised as general way to enhance the 
normative force of treaties.
83
 However, the above law and economics analysis is useful 
and valuable in giving insights for inducing more states to enter into treaties and for 
devising effective dispute settlement procedures.
84
 
2.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics 
A law and economics approach can explain when and how international contractual 
arrangement between states can be achieved or fail by using transaction cost economics. 
The transaction costs which are, for example, the costs of negotiating, arranging, 
monitoring, and enforcing a contract, significantly affects contractual arrangements. As 
with domestic contractual arrangements, of course, the development and operation of 
international agreements may be affected by the transaction costs involved.
85
 Transaction 
costs are even higher than domestic contractual arrangements due to the complexity, 
uncertainty, and the number of states in international relations. Thus, to understand 
international agreements well, one must know not only the benefits from international 
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cooperation but also the transaction costs of international agreements.
86
 
A law and economics approach can shed substantial light on rules governing the 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction that a state has power to legislate by applying 
transaction cost economics. Law and economics tries to analogise domestic property to 
international prescriptive jurisdiction.
87
 Under positive transaction costs, clear property 
rights can reduce transaction costs and can affect efficiency. As with the clarity of property 
rights, international legal scholars require clear international legal rules to regulate 
prescriptive jurisdiction. However, clarity is not always a solution for the problem of 
property rights. Although clarity is considered to reduce transaction costs, clarity cannot 
always solve the problem of jurisdiction. Clarity may be useful in circumstances where the 
initial allocation by property rules is difficult and where there are low transaction costs, 
allowing reallocation through transactions. On the contrary, if transaction costs are high, 
clarity is insufficient.
88
 According to Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis, while property 
rules may be preferable for economic efficiency in circumstances where transaction costs 
are low, liability rules may be appropriate for not only economic efficiency but also 
distributive results in circumstances in which transaction costs are high.
89
 The WTO 
dispute resolution system is one example that illustrates this analysis in international 
society. According to Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘The availability of relatively strong dispute 
resolution under the WTO has served as a magnet to draw in many types of claims that 
otherwise would have lacked strong institutional contexts.’90 
In addition, transaction cost economics can analyse international organisation or 
governance by applying the theory of the firm from the Coase theorem.
91
 Coase argued 
that although corporations generate agency costs, corporations exist because the 
transaction costs are larger than the agency costs. In other words, the corporations are 
made in order to avoid some of the transaction costs.
92
 Similarly, states can reduce 
transaction costs by joining together in international organisations when they need to 
cooperate for certain goods or ends, such as international security or international trade. As 
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Dunoff and Trachtman also noted, ‘This is the story of the institutional development of 
both the European Union (EU) and the WTO.’93 For example, the EU legal system 
alleviates a number of monitoring and incomplete contracting problems, establishing a 
monitoring system and agreements that prescribe relatively broad EU rules. The EU system 
can play an important role to minimize the transaction costs at the international level 
through these processes.
94
 Undoubtedly, an international organisation is not the same as a 
business corporation. However, the methods of analysing a business corporation which 
uses transaction cost economics can be applied to analyse international organisations and 
can give useful insights to understand international organisations.
95
 
2.2.4 Game Theory 
Game theory is particularly well suited to issues of international law and therefore may 
be a useful tool for international law scholars. Even though there have been relatively few 
game theory analyses of international law, game theory has accepted states as strategic 
actors.
96
 Despite the lack of research in applying game theory to international law issues, 
game theory can suggests an ideal framework for international law issues because game 
theory model well describe the real international world. Game theory is a setting of 
positive analysis about strategic behaviour. In a game theory setting, each player’s conduct 
is affected by the decisions of the other players. This is exactly the same as the 
international context, in which matters of reciprocal and strategic state behaviour generally 
arise.
97
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is the best-known model in which players fail to 
cooperate. Moreover, game theory has been extended and expanded to various games, such 
as repeated game settings in which players can recognize prior player’s information and 
can punish perceived non-cooperative action in subsequent games. The risk of retaliation 
by each player can frighten the other player from cheating.
98
 Through repeated game 
models, one can comprehend the factors that might affect a player’s strategy to change and 
adopt strategic behaviour to deal with other players’ strategies. Thus, game theory both 
‘helps to predict what strategies will be used in settings where players do not agree to 
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coordinate their actions and suggests steps that can be taken to improve the outcomes for 
the parties’.99 
These game theoretical explanations of international law issues can be found in some 
cases. For example, to maximise the benefit of realizing justice in international society, it is 
necessary that states voluntarily surrender individuals who violate international criminal 
law to international criminal court for punishments. However, when states encounter a 
decision on whether or not to surrender a suspect as their citizen to an international 
criminal court, they depend on other states’ action in the same situation. Generally, states 
are reluctant to surrender the suspect to international criminal court, which shows that 
states fail to cooperate to increase the benefit.
100
 This non-cooperative game can 
sometimes be overcome by modifying the game through monitoring and an enforceable 
agreement. Agreement to universal jurisdiction or an international court with mandatory 
jurisdiction may help to curb incentives to defect.
101
 
In addition, game theoretic analysis can show the important role of the Vienna 
Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT).
102
 To reduce transaction costs and incompleteness 
of contracts resulting from strategic calculation, game theoretic analysis represents a 
‘default rule’ to fill contractual gaps. When communication cost is high and information is 
incomplete – as is the case in the real international treaty context – states will fail to 
maximise the potential benefits from exchange. The loss of potential benefits depends on 
the institutions and rules controlling the transaction. Many provisions of the VCLT 
Convention are default rules, and these provisions are generally possible to apply to all 
treaties. As ‘contract law’ of international law, the VCLT is important for the efficiency of 
exchange
103
  
 
III. Compliance Theory 
   As the part II explains, law and economics can be a useful methodology of 
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international law. In this part, this paper will investigate the answer to the question ‘why 
states comply with international law’, using law and economics. It is very important to find 
the answer in order to show and discover the problem of international human rights law. In 
other words, the understanding of states’ compliance with international law can provide a 
key to reveal the matter of international human rights law. If one knows the key conditions 
under which states comply with and compares the key conditions with circumstance of 
international human rights regime, the problem of international human rights law and the 
starting point to improve will be more easily and clearly detected. Moreover, because one 
of the purposes of this thesis is to present theoretically coherent and logical explanation, 
this part will suggest law and economics approach to states’ compliance. Although there 
has been many theory of compliance with international law, these theories have limits to 
present a coherent and logical explanation. This part will review the previous theories and 
reveal the limits of the theories. 
1. Previous Studies 
1.1 International Legal Theories 
1.1.1 Managerial Model 
Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes argue that the ‘enforcement model’ of 
compliance should be replaced with a ‘managerial model’. Whereas the ‘enforcement 
model’ represents that compliance is achieved through coercive sanctions, a ‘managerial 
model’ emphasizes ‘a cooperative, problem solving approach’.104 After reviewing the 
various coercive devices, Chayes and Chayes contend that coercive devices are usually not 
useful to pull states to compliance.
105
 The need for coercive measures in order to make 
states comply with international law reflects ‘an easy but incorrect analogy to domestic 
legal system’.106 Moreover, Chayes and Chayes argue that ‘sanctioning authority is rarely 
granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used’.107 
Coercive economic or military sanctions for breaching international law cannot be the 
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main instrument of obtaining compliance with international law.
108
 This is because the 
problems of high political or economical costs, and the problem of legitimacy, are raised 
by a repeated use of sanctions.
109
 
Chayes and Chayes offer a ‘managerial’ model that states seek to promote compliance 
not through coercive mechanisms but through a cooperative model of compliance. In the 
model, compliance depends on interactive processes of justification, discourse, and 
persuasion.
110
 Instead of assuming that states’ compliance must be upheld with threats to 
make international law effective, Chayes and Chayes start with the premise that states have 
a propensity to comply with their obligations. The premise of states’ propensity to comply 
with international law is supported by three factors: efficiency, interests, and norms. 
Government actors can operate by a standard operating procedure that treaties supply. That 
is why compliance with established treaty norms is efficient. Moreover, a treaty is made by 
the consent of the treaty parties. As a result, the treaty can also contain the parties’ interests 
and play an important role in attaining their interests. Parties, therefore, must try to 
maintain an international agreement’s capacity to fulfil their interests. And, finally, treaties 
are considered legally binding instruments and generate legal norms. The legal obligations 
and social norms constrain states.
111
 
In the managerial model, non-compliance is caused by ‘ambiguity and indeterminacy 
of treaty language’, ‘limitation on the capacity of parties to carry out their understanding’, 
and ‘the temporal dimension of the social and economic changes contemplated by 
regulatory treaties’.112 Chayes and Chayes, therefore, assert an approach based not on 
coercion but on ‘management’. This approach posits that international law should be 
transparent about the requirements of parties’ conduct, should have a dispute settlement 
mechanism, and should enhance capacity for compliance. These elements can be factors to 
persuade non-complying countries to comply the international law. Chayes and Chayes 
claim that ‘[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an 
acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organization, and the wider public.’113 In this view, therefore, this persuasive discourse is 
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fundamental to compliance of international law. 
Although the managerial model offers a very useful analysis of certain types of 
international treaties, it cannot describe many other types of international agreements. 
Specifically, it provides a fulfilling explanation of agreements intended to resolve 
coordination problems, but it does not describe how international law works in other 
situations.
114
 In the case of coordination problems, after the parties have agreed to a 
certain action, none of the parties has an incentive to diverge from the agreement. 
Accordingly, compliance of the parties is expected even in the lack of enforcement. To 
explain the compliance in coordination cases, the managerial model can suggest theoretical 
foundation without coercion.
115
  
In circumstances about the use of international law outside coordination games, 
however, the managerial model cannot give satisfactory explanations. For compliance, the 
managerial model stresses that state interests are expressed in consent to treaties. However, 
the consent-based approach cannot explain why and how an international legal obligation 
affects state’s action. In addition, the managerial model insists that compliance does not 
result from the fear of sanctions but a legal norm which itself generates compliance pull. 
But this claim is nothing more than an argument that states comply with international law 
because it is law.
116
 Without a theory of why norms constrain states’ behaviour, the 
managerial model is not helpful.
117
 When a state breaches an international treaty because 
the treaty is contrary to the state’s interests, as is true in the real cases of international 
noncompliance, the managerial model fails to explicate. In cases where a state intentionally 
violates international law, the state in fact acts in or under potential sanctions from other 
parties or the broader international community. Consequently, in the absence of sanctions, 
the breaching state has no incentive to comply with international obligations. As a result, 
the managerial model is useful for coordination games but an incomplete model of 
compliance for outside of coordination games.
118
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1.1.2 Consent-based Theory 
International legal scholars traditionally attribute the international obligations to a 
fundamental doctrine, ‘pacta sunt servanda’. This doctrine requires that international 
agreements must be performed in good faith.
119
 While the doctrine is most often 
mentioned as the basis for the binding nature of formal agreements, some scholars have 
argued that this doctrine is the foundation of all international legal obligations. The 
traditional doctrines of international law in relation to obligations generally and treaties 
particularly are based on the theories of consent.
120
 The consent-based theory begins with 
an assertion that if a state does not consent, the state will have no obligation.
121
 In other 
words, the consent of a state establishes international legal obligation and causes 
compliance of international law. Moreover, the consent-based theory raises the statement 
that states should comply with international law because international law is legally 
binding.
122
  
However these claims fail to explain compliance fully because the theory presents 
consent as the foundation of obligation. The theory that states must comply with 
international law because of their consents cannot overcome ‘the double-edged character 
of that argument’.123 As Smith noted, ‘If states bind themselves only by their consent, how 
can those obligations survive the withdrawal of that consent?’ 124 Moreover, even if 
assumed to be correct, the theory is not enough to conclude that consent binds a state; that 
is, the consent-based theory ‘confuses a necessary condition for states to be bound with a 
sufficient condition’. 125 Consent, by itself, cannot give states an incentive to comply with 
international law. Eventually, the consent-based theory can explain the phenomenon that 
states comply with international law, but cannot explain why states comply with 
international law. Therefore, the theory either ‘says nothing about how states will actually 
behave’ or ‘is simply assuming compliance without explaining it’126 
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1.1.3 Legitimacy Theory 
Thomas Frank has proposed a general theory of international law known as 
‘Legitimacy theory’. In the Fairness in International Law and Institution, Thomas Frank’s 
main question is not ‘why do nations comply?’ but ‘is international law fair?’127 This is 
because, in his claims, rules that fail to have their legitimacy have little ‘compliance 
pull’.128 To be legitimate, rules ‘must be arrived at discursively in accordance with what is 
accepted by the parties as right process’. 129  In other words, rules must be both 
substantively and procedurally fair. 
Frank argues that four factors determine whether a rule is legitimate and, therefore, 
whether states comply with it. Where rules exhibit these factors, the rules appear to have a 
strong compliance pull on states to comply with international obligations. In contrast, 
where these factors are not present, rules seem to be limited for states to comply with 
international obligations because states are more tempted to seek short-term self-interest.
130
 
The first factor is ‘determinacy’.131 The ‘determinacy’ indicates the clarity of a rule or 
norm.
132
 According to Frank, ‘[T]he determinacy of a rule directly affects its legitimacy 
because in increasing the rule’s transparency, its fairness is made manifest, and thus its 
compliance pull on members of the international community is increased’.133 The second 
is ‘symbolic validation’.134 As with determinacy, the legitimacy of a rule is examined by 
its ability to communicate. The communication of authority is symbolic rather than literal. 
When a signal is used as a cue to extract compliance with a command, the symbolic 
validation of a rule happens. ‘The cue serves as a surrogate for enunciated reasons for such 
obedience.’135 The third is ‘coherence’.136 To be a consistent rule, a rule whatever its 
content must be applied consistently in every ‘similar’ or ‘applicable’ instance: ‘[A] rule is 
coherent when like cases are treated alike in application of the rule and when the rule 
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relates in a principled fashion to other rules of the same system.’ 137  The last is 
adherence.
138
 Adherence is related to the connection between a rule and the secondary 
rules used to interpret and apply the ‘primary rules of obligation’. The rule must be closely 
connected to the ‘secondary rules of process’. ‘Primary rules of obligation that lack 
adherence to a system of secondary rules of process are mere ad hoc reciprocal 
arrangements.’139 
However, the legitimacy theory has a theoretical problem. The theory only explains the 
phenomenon of the compliance when there is a procedural legitimacy, but cannot explain 
why states consider that procedural legitimacy to be important. In particular, the theory 
cannot provide a satisfactory theoretical description in cases where states violate 
international obligations with which they have complied. If legitimacy is the reason for 
compliance pull, states will not change their behaviour from compliance to non-
compliance under the same international law. Eventually, the theory cannot explain why 
states should care about legitimacy or why one should expect states to honour international 
law that has legitimacy while ignoring others. Therefore, the argument that legitimacy of 
international law can make states comply with the international obligations is just an 
assertion, ‘rather than the result of a theoretical framework or empirical study’.140 
1.1.4 Transnational Legal Process 
‘Transnational legal process’ theory has been developed by Professor Herald Koh.141 
As with the ‘managerial model’ and ‘legitimacy theory’, transnational legal process theory 
is also based on the assumption that states comply with their international obligations not 
coercively but voluntarily. In contrast to explanations of compliance just at the 
international level or at the domestic political level, transnational legal process seeks 
reasons for compliance at a transnational level: ‘interaction, interpretation, and 
internalization of international norms into domestic legal structures’.142 Transnational 
actors incite others to interact, and through those interactions, an interpretation or 
enunciation of the global norm is applicable to the situation. By the interaction, the one 
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actor pursues not simply to coerce the other actor, ‘but to internalize the new interpretation 
of the international norm into the other party’s internal normative system.’ 143 
Transnational legal process, such an interaction and internalisation, is normative, dynamic, 
and constitutive. The process generates a legal rule to guide future transnational 
interactions, and the future interactions will further internalize those norms. Eventually, 
series of such interactions make norms become internalised, and repeated participation in 
the process will lead to a reconstitution of the interests and even the identities of the 
participants in the process.
144
 
In transnational legal process, the internalisation of norms is caused by and happens to 
transnational actors. These transnational actors are usually not just policy personnel of the 
governments involved in the process, but also private norm entrepreneurs and several non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). Collectively these individuals and entities form an 
‘epistemic community’ to address a legal issue. ‘That community mobilized elite and 
popular constituencies and provoked a series of interactions.’145 They generate patterns of 
activity through which norms are internalised into domestic structures through executive, 
legislative, and judicial action. By these processes, domestic institutions generate self-
reinforcing patterns of compliance.
146
 Therefore, in dynamic processes of transnational 
law, repeated participation leads states to comply with international law, and compliance, 
in Koh’s words, ‘is not so much the result of externally imposed sanctions so much as 
internally felt norms’.147 
The claim that domestic legal institutions play a critical role in international law is 
somewhat correct.
148
 However, the claim that internalised international legal norm lead 
states to comply with international law has a theoretical or empirical problem. For example, 
it is true that a bureaucracy will often insist on compliance in circumstances that do not 
serve the state’s immediate interest. One is because the bureaucracy tries to escape or solve 
prisoners’ dilemmas, trading off unimportant short-term interests for more important 
medium-term interests. Another is because of agency costs that the bureaucracy incurs as it 
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tries to remain or expand its power about treaty regimes, even though its decision does not 
serve the state’s interests.149 However, both examples are not the evidence for internalised 
international legal norms but, ultimately, are based on a cost-benefit analysis. According to 
the results of Posner’s research, there is little evidence for transnational legal process 
theory in the United States Supreme Court.
150
 
Moreover, theoretically, there are two problems with transnational legal process theory. 
First, the question of why or when international legal norms triumph over the opposing 
self-interest of the state. There is no reason to consider that compliance with international 
law is the more important for domestic institutions. Second, different domestic institutions 
that have different institutional interests might have different approaches toward 
compliance with the same treaty. When domestic institutions differ on compliance issues, 
transnational legal process theory has trouble explaining state compliance.
151
 As a result, 
without an understanding of why domestic institutions internalise international legal norms 
and why this internalisation lead states to compliance, transnational legal process theory 
lacks persuasiveness.
152
 
1.2 International Relation Theories 
1.2.1 Realism 
According to classical realism, international law has no effect on state behaviour. The 
realists are sceptical of international norms, such as the principle of sovereign equality, 
self-determination, and non-intervention. In this view, a state’s behaviour depends 
exclusively on their geopolitical interests. Realism considers compliance with international 
law as an accidental phenomenon when the complying state’s interest is achieved through 
international law. Moreover, international law is made and complied with when it serves 
the interests of hegemony or powerful states, and this is because powerful states coerce 
other states to accept international law and comply with it. Thus, in this view, international 
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law is mostly a concomitant phenomenon.
153
 
‘Neo-realism’ or ‘structural realism’ has been developed from classical realism. 
Although neo-realism abandoned a focus exclusively on international power, neo-realism 
shares a concept of states as unitary actors and as the appropriate unit in international 
relations, using concepts from game theory and economics. Kenneth Waltzs argues that 
states are ‘unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a 
maximum, drive for universal domination’.154 In this view, compliance with international 
law exists not because the law is effective, but because there is a coincidence between 
international law and the self-interest of states in an international society governed by 
anarchy and state power.
155
 
Although realism has been dominant in academic and policy after World War II, the 
realist tradition has difficulties in explaining the real international world, and therefore is 
theoretically weak. Foremost, realism cannot adequately explain why states spend time, 
energy, and money on the creation of international treaties and organizations. For example, 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations for establishing the World Trade Organisation or 
conferences for United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea consumed enormous 
resources by most states in the world.
156
 In addition to international agreements, states 
spend resources in order to affect the customary international law in areas such as 
international investment law, human rights law, and environmental law
157
. From the 
realists’ argument that international law does not matter, this phenomenon is too difficult 
to be explained. Moreover, realism cannot describe why states claim that other states 
violate international law and why the accused states try to deny the allegation. Similarly, 
the fact that international dispute settlement has operated in many cases to resolve 
international problems weakens realism’s central claims.158 
1.2.2 Liberalism 
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A second international relations theory is liberalism.
159
 Liberalism considers that 
individuals and domestic groups in domestic political processes are the key actors in 
international relations rather than states. Accordingly, liberalism focuses on the domestic 
political dynamics at play within the interaction of states. Liberal theorists, such as Andrew 
Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter, have argued that understanding domestic processes 
is essential to understanding a state’s behaviour whether or not states comply with 
international law. Moravcsik asserts that ‘Societal ideas, interests, and institutions 
influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social 
purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments’.160 Moreover, from the 
perspective of liberalism, compliance depends on whether or not a state is liberal. In 
addition, Slaughter argues that liberal states tend to resolve disputes with one another in the 
‘zone of law’ than with non-liberal states in the ‘zone of politics’.161 To be considered as a 
liberal state, Slaughter represents that states have a representative government, protect civil 
and political rights, and have a judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.
162
 
Consequently, in the liberalism school of thought, compliance with international law 
results from the degree to which a state’s domestic structure is liberal. 
However, although the liberalists’ idea provides a good account of government action, 
liberalism is obstructed by its own complex model that focuses on the domestic structure 
and discards the assumption of unitary state actors. In liberalism, an assessment and 
prediction of compliance depends on an assessment of domestic politics which is 
characterised by complexity. The relationships and interactions between domestic 
institutions, and a domestic political situation, are factors which are too complicated to 
establish a general theory to explain states’ compliance with international law.163 Thus, the 
difficulty of this theory is that it uses an overly complex model in order to deduce 
predictable results about compliance. Ultimately, while liberalism can explain the positive 
phenomenon of compliance with international law, it cannot function as a general model 
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for state compliance.
164
 
1.2.3 Institutionalism 
The third international relations theory is institutionalism.
165
 Institutionalist scholars 
begin with ‘a similar model of decentralized state interaction’ in an anarchic world.166 In 
common with realism, institutionalism considers that a state is the main actor in the 
international field and is a rational actor that acts on the basis of its self-interest. However, 
in contrast to realism, institutionalism sees that international cooperation is possible and 
thinks that international institutions can facilitate this cooperation.
167
Institutionalism 
asserts that international institutions can make cooperation between states, reducing 
transaction costs and raising repetitive interactions.
168
 Ultimately, in this view, states 
comply with international law because it serves a state’s interests and facilitates 
cooperation between states. However, unlike legal scholars, most international relations 
scholars do not place international law at the core of the analysis.
169
 In addition, 
institutionalists ‘often misread Coase to the effect that institutions are always good 
whenever there is “market failure”’.170 
2. Law and Economics Approach to Compliance 
A law and economics approach is based on the rational choice theory which is more 
developed in international politics or relations, and therefore, shares the assumption with 
the neo-realism and institutionalism that a state is a unitary and rational actor in 
international field. In a law and economics approach, states behave in order to maximize 
benefit and avoid cost. However, in contrast to realism, law and economics thinks that 
international law can affect states’ behaviour. Eventually, a law and economics approach is 
basically more similar to institutionalism, shared rational choice idea and importance of 
institutions; though a law and economics approach is focused more on international law 
rather than other institutions. 
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A law and economics approach can recognise and consider the value of factors that 
liberalism and international legal theories emphasise as causes to influence states’ 
behaviour, although there are different theoretical foundations. Domestic politics and 
individuals and non-state actors that liberalism concentrates on can be considered as costs 
or benefits that influence and affect state preferences. Public choice theory, which is 
considered a part of law and economics and is close to liberalism because it focuses on the 
domestic political process, can sometimes give insights to understand how political 
leader’s own interests that differ from their citizen affect state behaviour or state 
preferences. In these circumstances, liberalism may complement the institutionalist model. 
In addition, in the managerial model, transparency, a dispute settlement mechanism, and 
enhancing state’s capacity are represented as factors that increase states compliance. These 
factors can reduce transaction costs, as understood by transaction cost economics. 
Determinacy as a rule’s transparency and coherence in Frank’s legitimacy model can also 
be understood to reduce transaction costs. Similarly, law and economics can consider 
transnational actors’ influence on state’s compliance in transnational legal process theory 
as a factor that increases domestic pressure or the costs of non-compliance under a cost-
benefit analysis, in spite of the model’s theoretical and empirical problems. Thus, though 
the other theories fail to properly explain compliance on their own, law and economics can 
consider these factors that other international theories represent under economic theories 
and, fundamentally, rational choice theory. 
2.1 Simple Models of Cooperation 
2.1.1 Coincidence of Interest 
The first simple model of cooperation between states is ‘coincidence of interest’. 
Goldsmith and Posner represent this model as a pattern of behaviour generated from ‘each 
state acting in its self-interest without any regard to the action of the other state’.171 In this 
model, each state gain private benefits from a particular action irrespective of the action of 
the other.
172
 Basically, the model is based on a circumstance in which all parties in the 
game have incentives to comply and no incentives to violate.  
Suppose that two countries established a treaty in order to prohibit satellite-based 
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weapons. Moreover, the technology to construct the satellite-based weapons system is too 
immature or underdeveloped to make the weapon system effective, and the cost is high and 
prohibitive. In this circumstance, even without an obligation of the treaty, neither country 
would try to develop the satellite-based weapons. 
 
Figure A
173
 
 Country 2 
Comply Violate 
 
Country 1 
Comply 10, 10 6, 8 
Violate 8, 6 4, 4 
 
 
In Figure A, if both countries violate the obligation of treaty, they obtain worse payoff 
(4) because they expended resources on the untrustworthy weapon system. Conversely, if 
both countries comply with the treaty, they can obtain the maximum possible payoff (10). 
If Country 1 violates and Country 2 complies, Country 1 worse off because of expended 
resources, and Country 2 also suffers a loss because despite an untrustworthy weapon 
system, Country 2 does not want its potential enemy to have the weapon. Consequently, 
compliance is the best strategy for each state in this circumstance, and in other words, 
regardless of the other country’s action, each country obtain maximum possible payoff if it 
complies with the treaty.
174
 
2.1.2 Coercion 
The second model is ‘coercion’. One state or an alliance of states coerces other states to 
engage in particular actions that serve the interest of the first state or states. For example, 
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suppose that a big and powerful state can make threats to punish a particular action, action 
X, conducted by a small and weak state, and the cost of punishment is insignificant. The 
weak state has two options to act whether it does action X or not. Then, the powerful state 
responds by punishing the weak state or not. If the weak state does not conduct the action 
X, the powerful state will obtains its highest benefits. The weak state can obtain higher 
benefits if it does not conduct the action X and it can avoid from punishment than if it 
conducts the action X and is punished. In equilibrium, the weak state does not conduct 
action X, and the powerful state does not punish the weak state. Thus, the threat of 
punishment by a powerful state can affect a weak state behaviour and be most credible 
when the cost of the punishment is low.
175
 
Under current international law, a treaty by coercion to states or representatives of 
states by threats or use of force is without effect or void.
176
 However, there are some 
international agreements by coercion. Historically, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles is an 
obvious example. By the treaty, Germany yielded their power to Allied Countries. As 
similar to many other peace treaties, the agreement was not entered into voluntarily, and 
Germany had no other choice and options. The agreement was achieved at coercion of 
powerful states. Moreover, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between US 
and Afghanistan is less obvious examples. The government of Afghanistan has urgently 
needed the US support. Because the decision by Afghanistan to enter into the treaty 
heavily depended on the US, the decision can hardly be considered as free choice.
177
 
Furthermore, another example as less obvious is the Hay-Bunua-Varilla Treaty of 1903. 
By this treaty, the US obtained the Panama Canal Zone and the right to construct the 
Panama Canal. To be similar to Afghanistan, at that time, Panama just declared 
independence from Colombia, and this is the reason why against Colombia, Panama had 
great needs the aid and protection by the US. In this coercive circumstance, the treaty 
‘granted the US one of the most valuable property rights in the world’.178 
2.1.3 Pure Coordination 
The third model is ‘pure coordination’. The pure coordination game is that there are 
incentives to cooperation between states, but to achieve the cooperation, the states 
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coordinate their actions.
179
 In the pure coordination game, as the coincidence of interest 
model, states concentrate on their interest. However, unlike the coincidence model, each 
state’s best action depends on the action of the other state.180 
 
Figure B 
 Country 2 
Action X Action Y 
 
Country 1 
Action X 3, 3 0, 0 
Action Y 0, 0 3, 3 
 
 
In the game as can be seen in Figure B, if the Country 1 engages in action X, the 
Country 2 will engage in the action X, and if the Country 2 engages in action Y, the 
Country 2 will engage in the action Y. Therefore, there are two equilibriums that the two 
countries engage in same actions: (X, X) and (Y, Y). After the countries coordinate on one 
action, either action X or Y, neither country has no reason to deviate. However, the main 
problem of this model is the first action of one country. If the Country 1 does not know the 
expected action of Country 2, the Country 1 will be difficult to choose action X or Y. Both 
countries may choose first and following actions randomly, but this pattern makes 
cooperation difficult and the countries fail to achieve the full benefits from coordination.
181
 
Despite the coordination problem, international law can help the coordination between 
countries, guiding each country’s first action. In the pure coordination game, if two 
countries make an agreement for their action and let each other know their first action, the 
countries can more easily coordinate and obtain full benefits from the coordination game. 
Because the problem of pure coordination game is first action problem, international law 
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which offer information about each country’s preferences and expected actions can be 
useful. One example is the system of rules and regulations concerning international air 
travel and air safety.
182
 These international agreements try to harmonise a range of 
standards. The gains from coordination in the rules of air travel are very clear. Because a 
single flight may cross over various countries, if airplanes in one country follow the one of 
safety regulations but those in the other country follow another, the cost of air travel might 
be seriously increased.
183
  
Though an international law can help the coordination, however, it does not mean that 
in pure coordination game, an international law plays a significant role for cooperation or 
compliance. To solve the coordination problem, the first action problem, states do not have 
to use formal international law. For example, states could use very simple forms such as a 
memorandum, an exchange of letters, or a meeting of representatives to elicit information 
for a preferable action from each other. Because states want to achieve the same benefits at 
lower cost, states prefer informal or simple forms of international communication to formal 
international agreements.
184
 Moreover, after coordination of the first action between states, 
the international law has no effect on behaviours of the states. In the coordination game, as 
can be seen in Figure B, after the countries coordinate on one action, both countries has no 
reason to deviate. Like coincidence model, the cooperation in the pure coordination game 
depends on coincidence of states’ interest rather than international law. Therefore, in the 
pure coordination game, although international agreements can help to achieve cooperation, 
it could only slightly more work than in coincidence of interest and would play 
insignificant role. 
2.1.4 Battle of the Sexes 
The fourth model of simple cooperation is another type of coordination game, called as 
‘Battle of the Sexes’ game. As similar to pure coordination game, in battle of the sexes 
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game, both countries have incentives to coordinate their actions rather than not to 
coordinate, and there are two equilibriums. Moreover, after one of equilibriums is chosen, 
neither country has no incentive to deviate. However, unlike the pure coordination game, 
one country might obtain better benefits in the first equilibrium while the other country 
might obtain better benefits in the second equilibrium. In other words, each country has 
incentive to coordinate in different equilibriums.
185
 
 
Figure C 
 Country 2 
Action X Action Y 
 
Country 1 
Action X 3, 2 0, 0 
Action Y 0, 0 2, 3 
 
 
In Figure C as battle of sexes game model, there are two different equilibriums: (X, X) 
and (Y, Y). If Country 1 chooses action X, Country 2 has no better choices than choose 
action X; if Country 1 chooses action Y, Country 2 has no better choices than choose action 
Y. However, Country 1 prefers (X, X) equilibrium while Country 2 prefer (Y, Y) 
equilibrium. Country 1may be expected to choose action X because of higher payoff than 
action Y, but Country 1 may also be worried that Country 2 will choose action Y in which 
situation Country 1’s payoff will be worse off as (0) than (3) or (2).186 Therefore, as 
similar to pure coordination game, this game model has the problem of first action but little 
more difficult. 
In the same way as pure coordination game, international law can also help 
coordination between the two countries, but it plays insignificant role in this model too. 
Though the process of choosing specific equilibrium is sensitive, after one of equilibriums 
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is chosen, neither country has incentive to defect. Consequently, in battle of sexes game, 
the coordination problem is to decide specific equilibrium in different preferences between 
countries, and after choosing the focal point, the countries will adhere their actions not 
with international law but with each country’s interest, maximising their payoff. 
International law just guides or provides what the focal point would be and help the first 
coordination in uncertainty. Moreover, although international law can be sometimes used 
to solve the coordination problems, states can achieve the same result by many other ways. 
Through NGO, unilateral actions, repeated practice or informal agreements, states can 
solve the coordination problems.
187
 For example, this type of coordination game could be 
found in the selection of a compatibility standard, such as allocation of radio frequencies, 
railroad gauges, or television broadcast standards.
188
 In addition, Guzman represents one 
further example, ‘the hosting of the Olympic Games’. 
States that would like to host the games in a particular year have conflicting 
interests. If Paris hosts the games, New York will not be able to do so. 
Cooperation is more difficult than in a pure coordination game, because the 
United States would like the games to be in New York while France would 
like them to be in Paris. Until a location is chosen, then, the parties’ interests 
are, to some extent, divergent. Once a host city is chosen, however, neither 
state has an incentive to defect. If New York is chosen for the Olympics, 
France is better off sending its athletes to New York than boycotting the games 
or attempting to stage some competing set of games in Paris.
189
 
In this case, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decides the host city and state. 
Once the decision is determined and announced, no state has an incentive to deviate. 
However, the IOC is a NGO, and states do not directly control over the IOC. Thus, this 
case represents that without a formal international law, legal enforcement, or even any 
action by states, cooperation can be achieved.
190
 
2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In real world, most international issues are more difficult to solve than above 
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mentioned games. If most international cooperation models were the simple cooperation 
games, one could observe more cooperation in almost all international issues, and a role of 
international law is not important and limited. However, most international issues that 
international laws control over are not explained by the simple models and are more 
complicated because states’ interests are often conflicted. Thus, to understand the real 
value of international law and its ability to make cooperation, one has to analyse how 
international law works in the difficult circumstances. If international law can make 
cooperation in these situations, it means that an international law has a real impact on state 
behaviour. 
 
Figure D 
 Country 2 
Cooperate Defect 
 
Country 1 
Cooperate 3, 3 1, 4 
Defect 4, 1 2, 2 
 
 
Figure D show the difficult cooperation model known as prisoner’s dilemma. In the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma, the basic assumption is that each player chooses their strategies 
without the other’s strategy because each player is in separated room and cannot 
communicate mutually, and that the game is one-shot game. Under this assumption, as 
represented in Figure D, if both countries cooperate, each country gains payoff (3), and the 
sum is (6). If one country cooperates, but the other defects, the defecting country gain 
payoff (4) and the cooperating country gain (1), and the sum is (5). If both countries defect, 
each gain payoff (2), and the sum is (4). In the game, although maximising benefit is 
cooperation, each country’s strategic behaviour will be defection. If Country 1 cooperates, 
Country 2 can obtain a higher payoff (4) by defecting than (3) by cooperating. If Country 1 
defects, Country 2 can again obtain a higher payoff (2) by defecting than (1) by 
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cooperating. Therefore, Country 2’s dominant strategy is defection whatever Country 1 
does. Country 1 would identically defect as it tries to evade from the worst situation. As a 
result, the countries gain worse off (2) by defecting each other than (3) by cooperation.
191
 
In the classic prisoner’ dilemma, the result of one-shot game is that both players will 
choose to defect. Therefore, cooperation will fail. International law cannot affect this 
outcome and state’s behaviour. ‘An agreement is simply an exchange of promises.’192 
Without central authority such as courts or polices, this agreement as an exchange of 
promises has no impact. Under this circumstance, any compliance is generated from not 
the agreement but other reasons. Because the agreement cannot achieve its goal or purpose, 
rational states would not be expected to enter into the agreement at all.
193
 
2.3 Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
However, the classic prisoner’s dilemma in which international agreements have no 
impact and states choose to defect lacks to reflect the real international world. There are 
some additional important differences.
194
 First, the countries can contact and communicate 
with one another. As distinct from classic prisoner’s dilemma in which players are 
separated in other rooms and cannot know other’s strategies, international community is 
open to contact and communicate with each other in order to choose their actions. Second, 
the prisoner’s dilemma that reflects more real world is not a one-shot game. In the real 
international world, states can repeatedly interact with each other. In the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma, players can play the game not only one time but over and over again 
with no fixed time. Third, therefore, it is possible that if one player defects in one round, 
the other player can respond to the first player by defecting in the next round. Forth, the 
information of state compliance or defection is often available to know each other. These 
differences can modify the classic prisoner’s dilemma into the distinct type of prisoner’s 
dilemma. While there is no solution for cooperation in classic prisoner’s dilemma itself, the 
modified game can make cooperation, efficient equilibrium through international law.
195
 
In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, there are many different strategic choices, 
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such as grim trigger, tit-for-tat, and therefore, the game has multiple equilibriums. These 
strategies are plausible reactions to defection by others.
196
 The first is grim trigger. The 
grim trigger strategy is that in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, player 1 begins with 
cooperation and remains the cooperation until player 2 defect, and if player 2 defects, after 
the round, the player 1 will defect forever. In the Figure D, assume that Country 1 prefers 
the grim trigger strategy and Country 2’s strategy is defection in every round. Country 2’s 
payoffs are (4), (2), (2), (2)…, because Country 1, in payoffs (1), (2), (2), (2)…, will defect 
in every next round after the first round. Unless Country 2 does discount the all the future 
payoffs in comparison with the payoff from defection, Country 2 will not choose the 
defecting strategy.
197
 Although defection by one player can make cooperation failure in all 
the future rounds, the grim trigger strategy as retaliation could be available to make 
cooperation. 
The second strategy is tit-for-tat which is one of the most discussed strategies in 
relation to the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The tit-for-tat strategy is that player 1 in the 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game respond to defection by player 2 with single 
defection.
198
 Assume that player 1 prefer the tit-for-tat strategy and that player 2 want to 
defect in first round, and after the first round, player 2’s behaviour depends on player 1’s 
reaction. If player 1 cooperates in the first round and player 2 defects, player 1 will defect 
in the second round. If player 2 cooperates in the first round, player 1 will remain to 
cooperate in the second round and until player 2 defect. The tit-for-tat is forgiving strategy 
while the grim trigger strategy is not. Thus, although the player 2 defects in the first round, 
if the player 2 cooperates in the second round, the player 1 will choose cooperation in third 
round. If the two players choose tit-for-tat, there exists possibility that cooperation fails. 
Assume that in the first round, both players cooperate, and in the second round, the player 
1 remains the cooperation and the player 2 accidently defects. In the third round, player 1 
will defect by tit-for-tat strategy, and player 2 will cooperate. In the fourth round, player 1 
will change its action from defection to cooperation because player 2 cooperated in the last 
round, but player 2 will also change its behaviour from cooperation to defection because of 
player 1’s defection in the third round. Thus, after second round in which defection by 
player 2 was accidently generated, if both players strictly adhere the tit-for-tat strategy, 
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cooperation could be failure. Although the possibility exists in the tit-for-tat strategy, 
however, the tit-for-tat can be a successful enforcement device. This is because a defection 
in any round will be encountered defection by others in the subsequent round
199
, and 
because the forgiving feature offers other players incentive to change their behaviour from 
defection to cooperation in the next round. As a result, the tit-for-tat strategy is possible to 
make cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. 
Besides those strategies, grim trigger and tit-for-tat, there are many other strategies that 
make equilibriums of cooperation or defection in the repeated game. Through those 
examples, ‘game theory simply suggests that cooperation is possible as long as the game 
has no fixed ending… and that the players have low enough discount rates that the current 
gains from defection do not loom too large in relation to long-term gains from 
cooperation’.200 Thus, the insight from analysis of the two repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
implies that cooperation between two nation states could be achieved over time.
201
 
2.4 Role of international law 
In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game which analogies real international issues, 
international law can play a significant role. To solve the prisoner’s dilemmas, states can 
use international law including customary international laws and international treaties. 
Firstly, international law can guide and make states to concentrate on particular 
equilibrium in the environment of multiple equilibriums. Under the circumstance of 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, ‘anything that tends to focus the players’ attention on one 
particular equilibrium, in a way that is commonly recognized, tends to make this the 
equilibrium that the players will expect and thus actually implement’.202 Therefore, states 
may make cooperation possible through international law while there is no precise 
resolution to the multiple equilibriums in the game theory.
203
 Secondly, in the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma, because mutual defection is an important factor, agreements on what 
constitutes defection and clear rule of the game are also important.
204
 If there is no clear 
rule of game and consent to what the defection is, when the defection is occurred, the cost 
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of dispute or debate what the rule is and whether the action is defection or not is increased. 
Consequently, international law plays a role to reduce the costs. Thirdly, international law 
can make close communication between states more easily and make states easy to defect 
as a punishment.
205
 States in international agreements can stay on close relationship with 
each other. In the relationship, because any plans or movements for defection may be 
opened as public knowledge and as subject of public debate, the actions toward defection 
can be easy to defect. Moreover, closed or improved communication can make the duration 
of one round shorter and thus, can reduce the short-term benefits from defection.
206
 
The repeated feature of the interactions between states and the role of international law 
allowed cooperation to be realised. States consider the value of cooperation ‘not only today 
and but also in the future’207, and international law can guide and help to make states to 
cooperate easily. The repeated nature and the role of international law can raise three 
fundamental costs called as ‘three Rs of compliance’ with international law: reciprocity, 
retaliation, and reputation. Through these three costs, one can understand how international 
law works and why states comply with international law.
208
 
2.5 The Three Rs of Compliance 
2.5.1 Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is responses to defections by other states and will often be operated 
‘without the intent to sanction a violator’. As reactions to a violation, states can leave or 
violate their obligations of international agreement because their interests may not be 
achieved through the agreement in the circumstance that other states violate. A reciprocal 
action does not make costs to the reciprocating state. Instead, in new circumstance or 
information that other states violate, reciprocity is a modification of the defected state's 
behaviour encouraged by a need to maximize the state's benefits.
209
 As definition by 
Keohane, reciprocity as general concept ‘refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent values 
in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a 
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way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad’.210 
Reciprocity is also often considered as a proper measure of behaviour that can make 
cooperation possible among sovereign states.
211
 Reciprocity can be often a successful 
compliance-enhancing tool in the right circumstances. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
in Figure D as a bilateral context, where reciprocity is well functioned, it is often adequate 
to produce cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma.  
 
Figure E 
 Country 2 
Comply Violate 
 
Country 1 
Comply 3-T, 3-T 1, 4-t 
Violate 4-t, 1 2, 2 
 
 
Assume that there is an international treaty between Country 1 and Country 2. Unlike 
customary international law, treaties entail transaction costs for negotiation, administration, 
enforcement, monitoring, and modifications or innovations. The transaction costs hinder 
formation and adherence of the treaties. In Figure E, the transaction costs are generated 
more from mutual cooperation, (T), than from partial cooperation, (t), so that (T) is bigger 
than (t).
212
 As the above game theoretic analysis of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, 
mutual violations and the threats of violations by a reciprocal reaction can make 
cooperation. The factor that explains the success of the treaty is the fact that Country 1 can 
forcefully threaten its own violation or withdrawal if Country 2 violates to its international 
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obligation. ‘Mutual compliance is enforced by a credible threat of non-performance.’213 
The treat of termination or mutual violations that make states cannot obtain maximising 
gains from compliance will be sufficient to encourage states to comply with international 
agreements unless states deal with the gains from a one-time violation greater than long-
term gains from mutual compliance. 
2.5.2 Retaliation 
Retaliation is a reaction or response of states to violation by others as similar to 
reciprocity, but unlike reciprocity, retaliation actions raise and impose some costs to the 
retaliating state.
 214
 If a reaction as response to violations is not costly, it will be forms of 
reciprocal non-compliance.
215
 Despite the costs, the reason why states use retaliatory 
sanction is that the retaliating state has intention to punish the violating state in order to 
make the violating state change its behaviour to comply with international obligations, and 
that states want to give signals to punish violations by others and pressure to future 
violations.
216
 In these retaliatory sanctions, there are various types. These could be 
economic sanction, terminating a treaty, and using military force as the most extreme 
case.
217
 For example, in WTO law, when a state declines to comply with dispute resolution, 
the complaining state can take the permission to impose trade sanctions.
218
 
 
Figure F 
 Country 2 
Comply Violate 
 
Country 1 
Comply 3-T, 3-T 1-c, 4-t-R 
Violate 4-t-R, 1-c 2, 2 
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Assume that there is an international treaty generating international obligation between 
Country 1 and Country 2. In the Figure F, as same in figure E, (T) and (t) mean transaction 
cost. (T) is bigger than (t). Moreover, because retaliation generates costs not only to 
violators but also to the retaliating states, in the retaliatory circumstances, both countries 
could take costs. However, costs for the retaliating states may be less than for violating 
states. In the Figure F, (R) means costs for violating state by retaliation, and (c) means 
costs for retaliating state. Therefore, (R) may be higher than (c). If the c is higher than (R), 
countries will not use retaliatory sanction. Where the retaliatory sanction is possible, unless 
Country 2 can obtain benefits, (4-t-R) in the figure F, from violation much more than 
benefits, (3-T), from mutual compliance, the retaliatory sanction will leads Country 2 to 
comply with international obligation. 
2.5.3 Reputation 
From definition by Guzman, a state’s reputation ‘consists of judgments about the 
state’s past behaviour and predictions made about future compliance based on that 
behaviour’.219 Reputation can play a role as a sanction to impose cost on a state when the 
state loses its reputation because of non-compliance. Reputational sanctions are not 
intended as punishment. When a state complies with international law, it offers a signal 
about its volition to respect international legal obligations. Other states can consider the 
compliance information to decide their own behaviour. On the one hand, if a state tends to 
comply with international law, the state will make a good reputation. On the other hand, if 
a state tends to violate its international obligations, the state will have a bad reputation.
220
   
A good reputation can be changed to future value, making promises more credible and 
future cooperation easier. If a state that has good reputation by previous compliances, when 
it pursues to establish cooperative agreements, the state will meet more partners, will be 
possible to demand more concessions, and will be able to make other partner cooperate or 
comply with the agreements.
221
 In the real international world, information for a state that 
seeks to make cooperative arrangements is limited, and also, a state has limited capability 
for prediction and calculation of the future payoff and other states’ action. Thus, states 
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would depend on reputation of other states that ‘represents a measure of its willingness to 
comply with its international legal obligations’.222 Conversely, if a state fails to comply 
with or violate international legal obligations, it can lose credibility and can have bad 
reputation. This bad reputation state will be viewed as ‘an unreliable partner’.223 Therefore, 
the state that has bad reputation will be available to make future cooperation difficult and 
will suffer from loss of benefits from cooperation with other states. 
 
Figure G 
 Country 2 
Comply Violate 
 
Country 1 
Comply 3-(T-r)+R, 3-(T-r)+R 1+R, 4-t-R 
Violate 4-t-R, 1+R 2-R, 2-R 
 
 
   If having or improving good reputation can generate value for higher payoffs, and bad 
reputation can make costs of violation, states will have strong incentive to maintain a good 
reputation and to try to comply with their international obligations.
224
 In the Figure G, 
assume that there is an international treaty between Country 1 and Country 2. As same as 
Figure E and F, (T) and (t) mean transaction cost, and (T) is bigger than (t). However, 
credibility from good reputation can reduce transaction cost by mutual cooperation because 
if both countries have good reputation, they will reduce transaction costs for negotiation, 
enforcement, and monitoring. This situation is reflected as (T-r) in Figure G. Reputation 
benefits or costs can be generated in both cooperation and violation. In the Figure G, (R) 
means reputation values: (+R) is benefit of reputation and (-R) is loss of reputation. If both 
Country 1 and Country 2 comply with the international treaty, they will reduce transaction 
cost (T-r) and obtain more benefits (+R). However, if Country 1 complies, but Country 2 
                                         
222 Ibid 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid, at 36. 
55 
 
violates, Country 1 will more benefits from (+R) good reputation by cooperation in spite of 
obtaining small benefit (1), and Country 2 will generate more costs (-R) from bad 
reputation by violation in relatively less benefits (4-t). In the case that one country comply 
and the other country violate, the gap between payoff from violation (4-t-R) and 
cooperation (1+R) is less than the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the examples, Reputation 
or reputation sanctions can reduce the payoffs from violation and increase payoffs from 
cooperation, and moreover, can reduce transaction cost from mutual cooperation. As a 
result, ‘reputation may be a powerful force in promoting compliance’.225 
 
IV. Problems of International Human Rights Treaties 
   From law and economics approach to states’ compliance with international law, the part 
III suggests that the three Rs are the key to induce states to comply with their international 
obligations. If the three Rs work well as costs of non-compliance in international human 
rights law, one can predict states’ compliance with international human rights obligations. 
However, if the three Rs are unworkable, one cannot expect states’ compliance with 
international human rights law. Because international law is self-enforcing system that 
there is no central enforcement mechanism, without the three Rs, international human 
rights law does not make states to comply with their human rights obligations unless there 
is other strong enforcement mechanism.  
In this part, this paper will try to answer some questions to problem of international 
human rights law, especially international human rights treaties. The first question is what 
the difference between contractual model of international law and international human 
rights law is. In the difference, the second is whether the three Rs work as costs of non-
compliance or not. The third is whether international human rights treaties have other 
strong enforcement mechanisms or not. Moreover, this theoretical analysis will be 
supported by empirical results of previous studies.  
1. The Concept of International Human Rights Treaties 
International law is generally understood as self-enforcing mechanism based on 
reciprocal character. Especially, International treaties can be traditionally understood as 
                                         
225 Trachtman, The Economic Structure, supra note 19, at 141. 
56 
 
similar as contracts in domestic legal system. Lord Mcnair implies that ‘[i]t is obvious that 
the treaty as a concept of international law has been mainly indebted in the course of its 
development to the agreement or contact of private law’.226 Moreover, Gerhart Niemeyer 
also argues that ‘[t]he axiom that contracts are binding obligations has become of 
paramount importance for the whole of international law, since it has been made the very 
foundation of its obligatory force’.227 The contract can be considered as ‘an exchange of 
commitments to the reciprocal advantage of the signing parties’.228 In addition, according 
to the VCLT, consent is central element in order to establish or constitute agreements 
between states.
229
 This mutual consent may be relevant to reciprocal character of 
international treaties. The importance of consent presumes that states pursue their interests 
primarily and that treaties are expression of mutuality of states’ interests.230 Therefore, the 
character of contract and importance of consent can make international treaties as self-
enforcing mechanism from their reciprocal character for states to pursue their interests in 
international matter international treaties control without central enforcement mechanism 
as analogy of repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. As Bruno Simma implies231, legal 
reciprocity is the most important character for self-enforcing mechanism for general 
international law. 
International human rights agreements are quite different from the traditional 
contractual model and reciprocal character of other international laws. According to 
Mattew Craven, ‘[t]he international law of human rights, as a subject, is almost universally 
understood as a distinct subdisciplines of the broader, more general, and apparently 
subject-neutral, international law.’ 232  International human rights agreements are not 
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exchanges of economic or security interests between states.
233
 For example, General 
Comment No.24 of the Human Rights Committee notes that international human rights 
treaties ‘are not a web of inter-state exchanges of mutual obligations… The principle of 
inter-state reciprocity has no place’.234 Moreover, according to Simma, 
In the case of human rights convention, however, there is simply no 
contractual quid pro quo to withhold. There is, sociologically speaking, no 
interaction between the parties onto which reciprocity could lock. Reciprocal 
non-application of a reserved provision by another State Party would not only 
be absurd but also legally inadmissible… [S]ince every State Party to perform 
the treaty obligations, a splitting up of such a treaty into pairs of bilateral 
contractual relations in respect of which the reciprocal alternation of the treaty 
standard envisaged by the Convention could operate, is impossible.
235
 
Thus, international human rights agreements are not considered as to be established 
on contractual and reciprocal basis 
Instead, International Human rights treaties may embody particular assumptions and 
suppositions that require special recognition of pre-existing moral norms on which the 
treaties are established.
236
 In the preamble, ICCPR declares that ‘recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family 
is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ and that ‘these rights derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person’. 237  The moral principle upholds 
international human rights agreements rather than reciprocal mechanisms do. When a state 
signs a human rights agreement, it seems superficially to make reciprocal promises to 
others not to engage in certain violations. However, the reason why state parties of 
international human rights agreements comply with their international obligations is not 
because one state can attain benefits from the other states’ complying – one state’s 
compliance may not give concrete advantages to others – but because their obligation is 
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based on moral foundations.
238
 
As a result of the different character, rights and obligations created by human rights 
treaties are not between states but between a state and its citizens or individuals. In other 
words, the human rights treaties are made for the protection of the interests of individuals. 
Most international human rights laws are treaties that are ‘concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law’.239 The form supposes that human rights 
are expressed in the way of a contractual bargain between states. Consequently, the 
individuals who are protected by and obtain benefit from the treaties are simply fortuitous 
beneficiaries. However, the object and purpose of the treaties as to protect or focus on 
individual or group human rights suppose that ‘the treaties are quasi-constitutional in 
character’.240 The two elements of ‘form’ and ‘function’ seem to be essentially at odds 
with one another, and moreover, two elements work in a conflict. Thus, the collided nature 
of international human rights treaties makes the treaties not to be contractual model of 
international treaties.
241
 
These different characters of international human rights agreements have been noted in 
various international court or human rights bodies. The first reference to the different 
character of the agreements occurred in advisory opinion on reservations to the Genocide 
Convention from ICJ. The court distinguished characters between general international 
treaties and international humanitarian or human rights treaties. The court stressed the 
special feature of the Genocide Convention. The court argued that: 
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and 
civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might 
have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is 
to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to 
confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a 
convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own ; they 
merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of 
those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the convention. 
Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual 
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advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect 
contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired 
the Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the 
foundation and measure of all its provisions.
242
 
In the opinion, the court considered that the Genocide Convention was established not 
simply from on sum of each state’s interest but on common interest for high purposes that 
protect certain human groups. 
   Similarly, in the case of Austria v. Italy, the European Commission of Human Rights 
concluded that: 
It follows that the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in 
the Convention are essentially of an objective character, being designed rather 
to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings from 
infringements by any of the High Contracting Parties than to create subjective 
and reciprocal rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves.
243
  
In the decision, the commission deemed that the ECHR has an objective character rather 
than subjective and reciprocal character. In addition, the commission represented that the 
object and purpose is to protect human rights of individuals. The commission also 
highlighted the different character of the ECHR. 
   The Inter-American Court too recognised the special character of human rights treaties 
in its advisory opinion. The court emphasised the lack of reciprocity in modern human 
rights treaties and the American convention on Human rights. In the opinion, quoting the 
decisions of European Commission and ICJ, the court insisted that: 
Modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in 
particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to 
accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the 
contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic 
rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both against 
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the State of their nationality and all other contracting States. In concluding 
these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to 
a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various 
obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within 
their jurisdiction.
244
 
The Inter-American Court declared the non-reciprocal characters of the human rights   
treaties from traditional treaties by reciprocal exchange of interests between states and 
different object and purpose of them. Even though the human rights treaties are established 
on consent by states as classical way, the human rights obligations are separated from the 
consent.
245
 
2. The Three Rs of Compliance 
International Human rights law has different or special character. Especially, 
international human rights treaties are not based on the traditional contractual and 
reciprocal features of general international agreements. The contractual and reciprocal 
character of general international law make the three Rs costs of non-compliance, 
reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation, work well in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game 
as analogy of real international issues. However, in international human rights regime, as 
the three Rs cannot work well as costs or externalities for non-compliance of states because 
of their different character, non-compliance may be more easily conducted by state parties 
in the international human rights treaties than general international law. 
2.1  Reciprocity 
   Article 60(1) of the VCLT codifies the general principle of reciprocal actions. In the 
VCLT, the reciprocity is reflected as suspending compliance and terminating the agreement. 
The Article 60(1) says that ‘[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties 
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending 
its operation in whole or in part’.246 Regarding a multilateral treaty, Article 60(2) suggests 
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that ‘[a] material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles’, in the 
subparagraph (a), ‘the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of 
the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it’, and in the subparagraph (b), ‘[a] party 
specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the 
treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State’.247 
Therefore, according to the Article 60, both in bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
reciprocal non-compliance and terminating agreement are generally justified. 
   However, the principle of reciprocity is not applied to international human rights 
treaties. Article 60(5) of the VCLT provides the exception from Article 60(1). The Article 
60(5) says that ‘[p]aragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of 
the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to 
provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties’.248 
In other words, the Article 60(5) means that reciprocal action to a violating party is 
impossible or not permissible to provisions in treaties for protecting individual rights. The 
word ‘treaties of a humanitarian character’ in this provision seem to be applied to 
international humanitarian treaties; however the general idea of ‘relating to the protection 
of the human person’ clearly makes it can be also applied to international human rights 
treaties.
249
 Consequently, in accordance with the article 60(5), even though one state 
breaches a human rights treaty, other party states cannot suspend the obligation or 
terminate the treaty. 
   These dual applications, the reciprocal action and the exception in article 60 of VCLT, 
are natural conclusion because human rights treaties are established on moral foundation 
rather than interests between states. As contractual model of international law is based on 
the consents between states as a contract or exchange of states’ interests, one state has the 
rights of reciprocal action to violating state, and by the reciprocity, implementation of the 
treaty can be assured between states. However, as international human rights treaties stand 
on the moral foundation, consents for establishing the treaties between states are merely 
declarations of existing moral values as human rights.
250
 As a result, the human rights 
obligations in the treaties are beyond the states’ consents and are not affected other states’ 
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non-compliance. 
   However, this exception cannot makes reciprocity, one of the three Rs costs, workable. 
International human rights regime does not raise cost of reciprocity for a state’s non-
compliance. When a state party in an international human rights treaty violates its human 
rights obligation as the state mistreats its citizens or individual rights, the other state parties 
cannot suspend their obligations and terminate the treaty due to the character of the human 
rights treaty and Article 60 of VCLT. From the game theoretic approach, mutual defections 
are good motivation or inducement for states to comply with their treaty obligation.
251
 Yet, 
in international human rights regime, reciprocity as mutual defection is not an effective 
cost ‘because (first) it is unlikely to occur and (second) the violating state would be 
indifferent to it, in any event’.252  
Even if reciprocity were possible and permissible, it would have insignificant or little 
impact on most human rights violating states. Goldsmith and Posner represent human 
rights relationship between two nations, nation A and nation B. They argue that:  
A which abuses its citizens and B which does not. A gains nothing if both 
nations agree to stop abusing citizens. The same is true if both A and B abuse 
their citizens. They lose something and gain nothing from a mutual agreement 
to provide greater protection to their citizens.
253
 
A violating state is indifferent whether other states reciprocate or not because other states’ 
reciprocal action cannot make any costs or benefits to the violating state.
254
 Ultimately, 
reciprocity is unworkable and unsuitable cost to make or induce states to comply with 
international human rights law. 
2.2  Retaliation 
   The second cost of non-compliance is retaliation. Retaliation is distinguished from 
reciprocity because retaliatory action raises cost for retaliating states. Retaliation can be 
rather considered as punishments or countermeasures for a violating state to change its 
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behaviour from non-compliance to compliance, such as economic sanction, cut-off in 
foreign aid, and exclusion from cultural or athletic events.
255
 The threat of retaliation can 
often be an enforcement tool, however like reciprocity, it does not work well ‘when the 
public goods are involved’.256  
There are several problems with retaliatory action as a cost for non-compliance of 
international human rights treaties. The problems are generally caused by the cost of 
retaliating action. Unlike reciprocity, retaliatory actions generate some costs to the state of 
imposing sanctions. Because of the sanctioning costs, a rational state will take the action 
when there are more benefits than costs.
257
 However, in circumstance of decentralised 
enforcements in international human rights treaties, there are no particular states that 
obtain benefits from compliance and also no particular states that suffer from other states’ 
non-compliance.
258
 Guzman even argues that ‘in the context of bilateral agreements, one 
reason to impose the sanctions is to acquire or protect a reputation as a state that punished 
violators, but this may not be enough’. 259  Moreover, in multilateral context, the 
sanctioning cost makes a collective action problem, known as ‘free-rider problem’. Even if 
the imposing sanction would be effective, each state has an incentive of free-riding on the 
benefits from retaliation by others. This is because if one state imposes sanction, the 
retaliating state will only bear the sanctioning cost, and other states can obtain the benefits 
of compliance without any cost.
260
 As a result, states evade the retaliating action, and thus, 
the international human rights regimes give no or little incentive to party states to retaliate 
a violating state. 
The lack of incentive of imposing sanction by other party states lead to reduce 
credibility of retaliation. When the credibility that retaliation works as cost of non-
compliance is recognised by party states, the cost of retaliation can induce states to comply 
with the obligations. However, if one state considers that when it violate its obligations of 
human rights treaties, other states have no incentive to impose sanctions, the state will 
violate more easily and less costly to its human rights obligations. If it is the case, the cost 
of retaliation by other states will be reduced, and therefore, retaliation cannot work well as 
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facilitation and inducement for compliance with international human rights obligations.    
2.3  Reputation 
   The last cost of non-compliance is reputation. As explained above, reciprocity and 
retaliation is unworkable and unsuitable cost for compliance in international human rights 
regimes. The reputation can be considered the most attractive enforcement alternative in 
the institutionalism. Oona Hathaway asserts that: 
The institutional model is left, then, with reputation as the primary anchor of 
compliance for all but those countries for which compliance is costless: States 
comply with human rights treaties to obtain or maintain a reputation for 
compliance and hence good international citizenship. In the institutional model, 
therefore, if countries change their behavior in response to human rights 
treaties, it is largely because of concern for their reputation.
261
 
Moreover, Guzman also claims that in international human rights area that involve public 
goods, reciprocity and retaliation generally lack credibility and suggests that reputation can 
relatively offer an incentive to comply with international human rights agreements.
262
 
Guzman represents the reasons that ‘there is no need for coordination, no need for formal 
adjudication of a dispute… and no need for costly actions by sanctioning states’.263 
   Although reputation can be a useful inducement for compliance with international 
human rights agreements, reputation has some limitations. First, cost of reputation is less 
raised in cases that it is difficult to detect the violations than in cases that states’ behaviour 
can easily be observed.
264
 As the violation of international human rights obligations 
happen in domestic jurisdiction of an individual member state, many violations are in fact 
difficult ‘to defect, to observe, and even more difficult to verify’. This circumstance 
generates higher cost for outside actors to gather, assess, and publicize the information on 
which strong reputational judgments can be established.
265
 
   Second, even though the information can be easily opened to other states, there are 
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various or multiple reputations that an individual state wants to manage. Generally, a state 
may be a party in a number of different international regimes such as trade, investment, 
security, environment, and human rights. In the multiple circumstances, there is no reason 
why the state has to be more concerned to build up an international reputation in human 
rights area than others. A violation of human rights obligation by a state does not mean that 
the state will violate its trade or security obligations, and the human rights violation cannot 
be directly correlated to other reputations.
266
 Unless the reputation about compliance of 
human rights treaties are connected with reputations of other fields, the reputation cost of 
non-compliance with human rights obligations will not be high enough for a violating state 
to change its behaviour. Practically, because the reputation cost for human rights is weakly 
connected to other issue areas, the reputation may give less incentive to state parties in 
human rights than in trade and security.
267
 Moreover, when a government that leads state 
or make a decision is changed by vote or election, reputation is possible to be uncertain 
whether the new leadership change a policy about compliance of its international 
obligations or not. As the policy depends on the political philosophy of a government 
leadership, former government’s reputation cannot directly continue in new government. In 
this case, the reputation cost is also weakly enforceable. 
   Third, when the reputation is used as a sanction, enforcing the reputational sanction has 
some problems. Like retaliatory sanctions, the reputational sanction has collective action 
problem. States may disagree with assessment of degree of one state’s violation, and as 
they may also have different relationships to the violating state, the reputational sanction is 
difficult to work as unanimous action.
268
 In addition, some blaming actions in human 
rights areas are not based on human rights treaties. For example, reports by NGOs, 
advocacy groups and states are not related to treaty obligation.
269
 Regardless of treaty 
ratification, they blame a state’s human rights condition. In this case, the blaming action is 
not the cost of non-compliance with treaty obligation but with moral norms, and therefore, 
the reputation is whether a state respects moral obligation and is not enforceable cost of 
legal obligation. 
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   These limitations do not mean that reputational cost cannot work in international 
human rights treaties. Though there are some limitations, where reciprocity and retaliation 
are not suitable and workable, reputation may be the only available cost of non-compliance 
in the three Rs. In these limitations, however, reputation alone may not give strong 
incentive to induce states to comply with their human rights obligations.  
3. Other Enforcement Mechanisms 
   As above analysis, costs of the three Rs do not work well in international human rights 
law. Because international human rights law as international law is also self-enforcement 
legal system, if the costs of three Rs are unworkable, compliances of international human 
rights obligation by member states are not or little expected. But, if other enforcement 
mechanisms in international human rights regimes exists and works well to ensure 
compliance, it is possible for states to comply with their human rights obligations. 
However, although there are some enforcement mechanisms in UN human rights system, 
the enforcement mechanisms have limitations to induce and assure compliance as 
international legal system. 
   There are three main enforcement mechanisms in UN human rights system. The first is 
human rights committees. The committees are established by each human rights treaty as 
treaty-based human rights mechanism, and there are 10 human rights committees in UN 
human rights treaties. The role of the committees is to ensure states’ compliance with the 
treaties, providing guidance and interpretation to member states and reviewing periodic 
reports produced by the member states. In the reports, the member states demonstrate that 
how the human rights treaty is implemented.
270
 Moreover, some committees have 
authority to hear individual petitions
271
 or authority to initiate inquiries
272
 in case that 
relevant state ratifies the related human rights treaties. In the mechanisms, however, ‘the 
committees do not act as judges or enforcement authorities, but can initiate a dialogue with 
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the country, albeit only if the country cooperates’.273 
   As the committees cannot play a significant role in human rights enforcement, the 
committee systems are not importantly considered by member states. Regarding periodic 
report, by 2011, merely 16 percent of member states had submitted periodic reports just in 
time. About 20 percent of member states have never offered the periodic reports under 
ICCPR, ICESCR, and CAT.
274
 Moreover, concerning petitions, because the committees 
have no power to impose sanctions, remedies, or legally binding judgements, individuals 
suffered from human rights abuses and their advocate do not take seriously to use the 
committee’s petition system. In his book, Posner represent the results of the committee 
mechanisms that: 
The Human Rights Committee – the committee associated with the ICCPR – 
has received 1,677 petitions since 1976, or about 45 per year. The Committee 
found violations in 809 cases and received a “satisfactory response” from the 
country in only 67 of them. The Committee Against Torture – the committee 
associated with the Convention Against Torture – has heard only 284 petitions 
since 1990, or only about 12 year. The Committee found violations in 76 cases, 
and received a “satisfactory response” from the country in 37 of them. Only 26 
cases have been brought to the CEDAW committee since 2004. The committee 
found violations in 13 cases, received a “satisfactory response” in 4, and is 
engaged in dialogue in the others. Only 50 cases have been brought to the 
CERD committee since 1988. The committee found violations in 14 cases, and 
received a satisfactory response in 4.
275
 
Based on these results, Posner argues that the enforcement mechanism of human rights 
committees could not affect government policy or states’ behaviour.276 Consequently, the 
human rights committee system including periodic reports and petitions do not work well 
and even do not impose the enough cost of non-compliance, and thus, the enforcement 
mechanism is not appropriate to induce compliance or to change states’ behaviour. 
   The second system is the UN Council on Human Rights. Like human rights committees, 
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the council has the authority and the power to monitor the implementation of human rights 
obligations.
277
 However, unlike the committees, the council’s monitoring action is broader 
and more general than the committee system because the council is not tied with any 
particular human rights treaties as charter-based human rights mechanism. As the council is 
composed of governments rather than experts, its evaluations and resolutions are more 
easily found in news reports than the human rights committees. 
   The council is the successor of the UN Commission on Human Rights. In 2006, the UN 
replaced the commission to the council. However, the monitoring effort was not successful, 
and many criticisms had been raised with respect to problems of this council. First, many 
of the commission member states were the serious human rights violators, such as Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Second, in consequence, the commission lacked to criticise the 
worst human rights violation states. Third, most critics of the commission were 
concentrated on Israel. Fourth, there was a tension between Islamic countries that argued 
the theory of defamation of religion and the Western countries that rejected this argument. 
In the critics, after changing structure from the UN Commission on Human rights to UN 
Human Rights Council, the Council tried to limit the qualification of member states as 
countries respecting human rights. Despite the efforts, human rights violators still take 
their position in the council. Moreover, although the council’s criticism has been widened, 
the council still focuses on Israel and pays little attention to other countries that have worse 
human rights records.
278
 
   According to 2009-2010 report card about the UN Human Rights Council by Freedom 
House, the Council has failed ‘to call special sessions or pass resolutions on pressing 
human rights issues, and to respond to the growing global threat against freedom of 
association’.279 Regarding the election to the council members, the report notes that the 
number of countries with strong human rights records has been decreased since the first 
ballot in 2006.
280
 Conversely, the number of rights-abusing countries has been increased 
in the council. ‘As a result, the ratio of rights-respecting countries to rights-abusing 
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countries has been slowly shifting in the wrong direction.’281 In addition, the report argues 
that ‘[t]he Council has issued condemnatory resolutions on only a handful of countries, 
including a disproportionate number on Israel’, and further, that ‘[t]he Council did not 
issue a resolution on Iran, despite evidence of massive human rights violations in that 
country throughout the year, and no resolutions were passed to address ongoing systematic 
abuses in countries such as Belarus, China, Cuba, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and 
Syria’.282 Overall, the limitations of the UN Commission on Human Rights are still being 
continued in the council. Therefore, like the Human Rights Committee system, the council 
is also considered that it lacks substantial effectiveness as enforcement mechanism to 
change states’ behaviour. 
   The last in the UN human rights system is the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR). The OHCHR was established in order to improve coordination 
between many human rights bodies and to work as leader in the human rights bodies. The 
OHCHR is a mandate to advance human rights. Moreover, as the secretariat for the Human 
Rights Council, the OHCHR offers various assistances such as administrative support to 
the human rights committees, advice about human rights standards for countries, and 
pressure on other UN organs. However, the OHCHR does not contain any legal authority, 
and it just work as a political office. Like other UN human rights mechanisms, it is not 
considered as effective human rights enforcement mechanism, and as a result, ‘[l]ittle has 
been written about the OHCHR and its role in enforcing human rights law’.283 
   In sum, among the three Rs of non-compliance, only reputation cost is little workable 
and suitable in international human rights regime. Reciprocity and retaliation are 
unworkable because international human rights laws have different character. Moreover, 
other enforcement mechanisms such as the Human Rights Committees, the UN Council on 
Human Rights, and the OHCHR have problems to make states comply with international 
human rights obligations. In these circumstances, non-compliance is expected to be easily 
taken by states with little costs, and very small number of compliance would exist in 
limited conditions. 
4. Empirical Studies 
                                         
281 Ibid, at 3. 
282 Ibid, at 2. 
283 Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law, supra note 8, at 47. 
70 
 
   From the problems of international human rights law, one can predict that international 
human rights law has no or little effects on states’ behaviour. A state obtains little costs 
from violating its human rights obligations, and therefore, states’ compliance does not 
depend on international human rights law itself but domestic law and culture.
284
 For the 
question of real compliance or relationship between international human rights law and 
states’ behaviour, some scholars have researched to answer the question, using empirical 
data and a quantitative method.  
   Linda Camp Keith tested the relationship between ratifications with ICCPR and degree 
of improvement of human rights. Keith examined human rights data in 178 countries over 
18 years from 1976 to 1993.
285
 Keith argued that the result of testing data implies that 
there is no significant relationship between ratifications of ICCPR and real states’ 
behaviour. She also suggested that: 
Overall, this study suggests that perhaps it may be overly optimistic to expect 
that being a party to this international covenant. The results are consistent with 
the assertions that the treaty's implementation mechanisms are too weak and 
rely too much upon the goodwill of the party state to effect observable change 
in actual human rights behavior.
286
 
Ultimately, Keith asserted that the ICCPR have no strong effects to change states’ 
behaviour and to improve human rights. 
   A similar result was released by Oona Hathaway. Hathaway examined data of broader 
human rights treaties about genocide, torture, fair trial, civil liberty, and women’s political 
equality.
287
 Like Keith, she also argued that ‘[a]lthough the ratings of human rights 
practices of countries that have ratified international human rights treaties are generally 
better than those of countries that have not, noncompliance with treaty obligations appears 
to be common’.288 Moreover, according to her analysing data, in some cases, ratification 
of human rights treaties is connected with worse human rights practices, and these cases 
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are not infrequently than expected.
289
 In other words, Hathaway asserted that ratification 
of human rights treaties has no impact on individual states’ human rights practices and 
even sometimes leads to worse human rights practices. In addition, Hathaway suggested 
other point that ‘[f]ully democratic countries that have ratified the universal human rights 
treaties usually have better human rights ratings, on average, than those that have not’. 
However, when the group of democratic countries was expanded, the result showed that 
the democratic countries seem to have no better human rights practices.
290
 
   Another research result by Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui supported 
the two previous studies. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui represented two findings. The first is 
that ‘state commitment to the international human rights legal regime does not 
automatically translate into government respect for human rights’. 291  Moreover, like 
Hathaway, they found that the ratification is associated with non-compliance behaviour and 
worse human rights record. The second is that ‘states whose citizens belong to a greater 
number of International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are more likely to 
protect the rights of their citizens’.292 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui suggested that the linkage 
to global society is more important factor for states to improve human rights practice than 
international human rights law itself. 
   Eric Neumayer found some positive evidences that the ratification of human rights 
treaties is connected with better human rights performances in more democratic countries. 
Moreover, the ratification becomes more beneficial for countries that more citizens tend to 
join in INGOs. However, supporting Hathaway’s result, his analysis implies that the 
ratification often leads no difference and can even lead worse practices in non-democratic 
countries such as in autocratic regimes or in weak civil society. Moreover, Neumayer 
found only few cases that the ratification of human rights treaties unconditionally impacts 
on human rights practices in member states. As a result, he asserted that ‘[i]n most cases, 
for treaty ratification to work, there must be conditions for domestic groups, parties, and 
individuals and for civil society to persuade, and perhaps pressure governments into 
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translating the formal promise of better human rights protection into actual reality’.293 
   Recent research result by Beth Simmons represented some positive effects of the 
ratification of human rights treaties. Simmons examined data of 13 treaties or treaty 
provisions. She represented evidences of human rights improvements connected with the 
treaty ratification. According to her analysis, the ratification of human rights treaties 
improves civil rights, such as religious freedom and fair trial, and some of women’s rights 
and reduces death penalty and child labour rate. However, the results are not found in all 
counties but some countries that are partial democracy and transition countries toward 
democracy. To be contrary, in stable democracy and stable autocratic countries, the treaty 
ratification does not have the same effects. Moreover, in stable democracy, the ratification 
of human rights treaties sometimes is related with worse human rights performances. For 
example, high rule-of-law countries that have ratified the CAT tend to use more torture 
than other high rule-of-law countries that have not ratified. In other cases except civil 
rights, some of women’s rights, and some of child’s rights, Simmons found no statistical 
significances.
294
 
   Overall, most studies have found no statistical evidence that the ratification of 
international human rights treaties make states improve human rights practices or respect 
human rights obligations. On the contrary, some studies represent some evidences that the 
treaty ratification is correlated with worse human rights practices of authoritarian states. 
Moreover, democratic states have even widely participated in violation of CAT or using 
torture. Only a few studies have found little improvements in very limited circumstances. 
Regarding these human rights reality, Posner insists that ‘a small number of treaty 
provisions may have improved a small number of human rights outcomes in a small 
number of countries by a small, possibly trivial amount’.295 Consequently, these studies 
suggest that there is weak evidence that international human rights treaties can make better 
human rights practices, and one can state that modern human rights treaties have problems 
to induce states’ compliance for better human rights world.  
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V. Conclusion 
   In modern international society and international relations, international laws have 
generally played important roles. With the development and expansion of international law, 
international human rights law have also evolved. The development of international human 
rights law is very important in modern international society and is considered a victory and 
achievements of international law. It has been expected that the more international human 
rights treaties there are and the broader area international human rights laws govern, the 
better human rights world international human rights laws make and secure. But some facts 
are found in the real world that these expectations are not achieved through international 
human rights laws. The value and worth that international human rights law want to ensure 
have been still infringed. 
To know or discover the problem of a gap between expectations of international human 
rights laws and realities of human rights protections, this paper explores the answer to 
three questions: ‘what is a better way to understand international law?’, ‘why do states 
comply with international law?’, and ‘what is the problem of international human rights 
law?’. The first answer is that a law and economics approach or analysis is a better way to 
understand and to study international law. Despite of some concerns, law and economics is 
a very useful tool for international legal researches. The second is that according to law 
and economics analysis of international law, the key points for understanding states’ 
compliance with international law is the costs of three Rs: reciprocity, retaliation, and 
reputation. International law is a self-enforcing mechanism system. In such a system, the 
costs of three Rs play a significant role to induce and facilitate states to comply with 
international law. However, as the third answer, in international human rights regime, the 
costs of three Rs do not work well because of different character of international human 
rights treaties. The reputation cost only little works, and the reputation cost alone do not 
generate enough cost of non-compliance. Moreover, there are no strong enforcement 
mechanisms to make states’ compliance in international human rights treaties. As a result, 
international human rights law has problem to induce states to comply with international 
human rights obligations. These theoretical analyses can be supported by many empirical 
research results. Overall empirical and statistical research results find that there is no 
significant evidence between international human rights law and human rights 
improvements. 
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This thesis does not argue that international human rights law is meaningless or 
unnecessary. The efforts for protection of human rights through international law have 
been continued, and it must continue in the future. However, legalism or 
institutionalisation of international human rights that do not correctly recognize the 
problem of international human rights law can be wasteful of resources. Moreover, it is 
impossible to avoid a decrease in the authority of the international human rights law by 
subsequent non-compliance. Therefore, this thesis points out that such problem of 
international human rights law and presents a starting point for further discussion for in 
order to improve protections of human rights through international law. 
From the conclusion, this paper suggests the direction of the new research. The first is a 
study of strong enforcement mechanism in international human rights law. Due to the 
nature or concept of international human rights law, in order to ensure compliance of states 
with their human rights obligations, international human rights law must have the strong 
enforcement mechanisms; detailed discussion for this should be done. The second is an 
international legal research on human rights and other areas such as relationship between 
economic development and human rights. According to some studies, economic 
development can lead to improve human rights. Thus, it is necessary to study of how the 
economic development and human rights improvement are connected and how 
international economic cooperation through international economic law assists to improve 
human rights.  
Protection of human rights through international law is very important. It may be the 
mission of this era for freedom of human being. However, just producing international 
human rights law and vaguely expecting that international human rights law can save the 
world are not helpful for protecting human rights. Rather, to recognize the limitations of 
international human rights law and then to seek out improvements to the problem may be 
more important for the protection of human rights. To solve human rights violation and to 
improve human rights through international law, we must have cool heads but warm hearts 
that means considering justice and human rights and using empirical and logical methods 
in order to achieve the goals. 
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